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ABSTRACT 
In this study an equilibrium asset-market model of the housing 
market is developed. The model is used to examine the effects of 
inflation on the Australian housing market under the maintained 
hypothesis of rational expectations. It provides a theoretical basis 
for empirically testing several hypotheses about the effects of 
inflation, however, the scarcity of relevant and reliable data is an 
important limitation, and the results are of consequential 
significance only. 
Two streams of literature that have emerged from 
American research in this area are drawn together in the present 
study and, to that end, the theoretical model presented herein serves 
as a useful extension and adaptation of previous models. 
Specifically, attention is directed to the influence of 
inflation on current housing demand decisions through: the 
characteristics of the mortgage instrument; the institutional 
features of the mortgage market; and the user-cost of home 
ownership. 
Generation of the testable hypotheses necessiates a brief 
discourse on the evidence of a 'Fisher effect' in the determination of 
nominal interest rates in Australia. Some simple experiments are 
performed in an attempt to provide empirical evidence, consistent 
with previous cited research, of the absence of such an effect. 
ix 
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1.1 INTRODUCTION 
During the 1980's the Australian housing market has experienced 
much volatility. A significant downturn in lending for housing 
during 1985-86 provided a major impetus to the partial deregulation 
of the market for housing finance. In a bid to increase the 
availability of funds, from April 2, 1986 the government allowed 
banks to charge a market rate of interest to new borrowers. A 13.5 
percent ceiling was, however, retained for existing borrowers. 
After that time, interest rates began to fall and the 
availability of funds improved. This, together with government 
policy designed to stimulate housing demand, among other things, 
fuelled a housing boom. Lending for housing reached record levels, 
increasing by more than 76 percent (in seasonally adjusted terms) 
during the year to March 1988, and house prices soared. 
Concerns that the market was over-heating led many, 
including the Federal government, to warn of the need to take the 
steam out of the property engine before it ultimately collapsed in an 
inflationary heap. This has been achieved in Australia's recent 
economic climate since high national debt has resulted in tight 
monetary policy and rising nominal interest rates have served to 
1 
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slow the housing market significantly. 
The recent volatility of the market, together with the 
controversial debate amongst academic commentators about the 
deregulation of housing interest rates, [see for example: Yates, 1981a; 
Albon and Piggott, 1983; and Anstie et al., 1983] has generated 
renewed interest in the extent to which housing decisions are 
influenced by inflation and changes in nominal interest rates. The 
present study is an attempt to shed some light on this issue by 
examining the impact of inflation on housing demand in Australia 
through two channels. These are; first, the potential inflation-
induced distortions that arise from general institutional features of 
the market for housing finance and, second, the impact of inflation 
on the user-cost of home ownership. 
From a modelling perspective, one objective is to draw 
together two streams of literature that have emerged from American 
research in this area. A typical approach has been to specify and 
estimate an inverse demand function for housing and ascertain the 
effect of inflation through the explanatory variables in which 
inflationary channels have been incorporated [see Kearl, 1979; and 
Follain, 1982]. More recent studies have recognised the need, given 
the nature of the housing demand decisions examined, to look at 
uncertainty explicitly. This study adopts the 'typical approach' but 
captures the initiative of these more recent authors by applying a 
rational expectations approach to the issue of uncertainty and 
expectation formation, as exemplified in the work of Poterba (1984). 
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1.2 INFLATION AND THE MARKET FOR HOUSING FINANCE 
There are two specific effects that inflation may have on the market 
for housing finance which are the direct concern of this study. The 
first, known as the "tilt" or "front-end-loading" problem, focuses on 
the interaction between inflation and the long-term Standard Fixed 
Payment Mortgage (SFPM) within an imperfect capital market. 1 It 
is argued that inflation, even when it is anticipated correctly, 
produces distortions in the mortgage market which, given the 
importance of mortgage finance to the demand for owner-occupied 
housing, have a sharp dampening effect on housing demand [see 
Lessard and Modigliani, 1975; Kearl, 1979; Schwab, 1982]. The second 
is through the non-price rationing of housing finance by lending 
institutions [see Alm and Follain, 1984; Male, 1988]. 
1 The SFPM, or constant nominal payment fully amortising mortgage, is 	an 
annuity which specifies a term, principal, nominal interest rate 	and constant 
nominal payment such that the present value of the stream of payments 	made 
by the mortgagee is equal to the amount of the 	loan. It is also referred to as a 
credit foncier loan. 
-r 
That is: PV of stream = z 	 + 	 RT  
of payments '6 " (1+ot 	(1+01 	(1+i 	(14 
= amount of loan 
where 	R1+ R2+ + 111. is the stream of constant nominal mortgage payments; 
T is the term of the mortgage or amortisation period; and 
i is the nominal mortgage interest rate. 
The mortgagee's nominal payments are calculated at the time (t=0) when the 
mortgage is secured. He expects, in the absence of inflation, to pay R nominal 
dollars for T periods. Since the nominal interest rate is variable, the nominal 
repayments on such a loan change when the nominal interest rate changes. 
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1.2.1 	The 'Tilt' Problem 
Although the interpretation of the 'tilt' problem varies somewhat 
amongst authors, the central postulate remains that, when house 
purchases are financed through a SFPM, anticipated inflation will, by 
increasing the nominal interest rate via the Fisherian adjustment 
process, increase nominal mortgage payments and 'tilt' the stream of 
real mortgage payments towards the initial years of the mortgage 
(given no change in the term of the loan). This, in turn, is likely to 
lead to cash-flow problems for some mortgagees who are, as a result, 
forced to commit a larger proportion of their current income to 
service their mortgage. 
The future path of inflation cannot be known with certainty. 
There is a risk implied by uncertain inflationary expectations and the 
SFPM shifts this risk to the mortgagee. The incorporation of an 
inflation premium in the nominal mortgage interest rate, together 
with the continued use of the SFPM, may distort the housing market 
as incumbent mortgagees are not freely able to adjust to different 
loan configurations. 2 The nature of the resulting distortion is 
manifested as a change in both relative prices and the rate of capital 
accumulation. 
Figure 1, originating from the work of Tucker (1975), shows 
2 Indeed, a remarkable feature of the Australian market for 	housing 
• finance has been a failure to adapt loan contracts to changing 	circumstances. 
There has not been, for example, widespread adoption of those mortgage 
instruments designed specifically to overcome the problems mortgagees face 
because of the increased burden of debt in the early years of their contract, 
namely; graduated payment mortgages and shared appreciation mortgages. 
For a discussion of these see Yates (1983). 
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vividly how inflation, through its 'tilting effect', changes the real 
value of the quarterly mortgage payments on a 20-year, $70,200 loan 
bearing a real rate of interest of 6 percent [see Appendix A for the 
calculations upon which this graph is based]. 
3000 	 
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FIGURE 1 
Effect of Inflation on Repayment Burden 
Specifically, if inflation is anticipated, and the nominal 
mortgage interest rate increases through Fisher's (1954) adjustment 
process, then the nominal mortgage payment increases. The present 
value of the real stream of payments over the term of the mortgage 
(discounted at the real rate of interest) remains unchanged and the 
mortgagee's real financial position over the term of the mortgage 
need not deteriorate. Under the assumption of homogeneity, if prices 
and income change by the same proportion, the quantity of the good 
5 
CHAPTER ONE: Introduction 
demanded will not change. Indeed, if anticipated inflation increases 
the mortgagee's nominal income by the same proportion as the 
increased price of owner-occupied housing, in a perfect capital 
market, we would expect the demand for owner-occupied housing to 
remain unchanged. 
The tilt problem arises, however, because the mortgagee is 
unlikely to face a perfect capital market. The potential cash-flow 
problems are the result of three factors. First, imperfections in the 
capital market prevent the immediate delivery (with inflation) of the 
higher nominal income necessary to meet the higher mortgage 
repayments. Second, these mortgagees are typically, in the same 
imperfect capital market, unable to borrow in the current period 
against either their expected future higher nominal income or 
against any nominal capital gains that they expect to accrue over the 
term of the mortgage. Third, the mortgage contract represents a 
forced pattern of saving (housing equity acquisition) and therefore 
the incumbent mortgagees must respond in the current period with 
an intertemporal substitution between housing and non-housing 
consumption. These factors provide grounds for claiming that the 
effect of inflation on the demand for owner-occupied housing is 
inherently non-neutral. Further, the incentive that an inflationary 
environment provides for lenders to pass on inflation risk by using 
variable interest rate lending arrangements may also exacerbate the 
problem. 
While much attention has been given in the literature to this 
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effect of anticipated inflation, the distinction between anticipated 
and unanticipated inflation has been either blurred or ignored. This 
distinction will now be considered briefly. 
Anticipated inflation refers to a rise in the general price 
level that is expected and is thus characterised by the market's 
response to this expectation. For example, if monetary authorities 
announced their intention to expand the money supply, market 
participants would anticipate an increase in the general price level 
and thus inflation. Unanticipated inflation, on the other hand, "is 
characterised by market phenomena implied by the alternative 
postulate that the contemporaneous level of prices is expected to 
persist." [Alchian, 1977, p.363] That is, market participants anticipate 
that the current general price level will prevail in the next period. 
In a similar example, unanticipated inflation would follow if the 
monetary authorities did not announce their intentions and naive 
anticipations were based on an information set which did not include 
knowledge of the ensuing monetary expansion. Actual inflation in 
the next period would exceed that which was anticipated, the 
difference representing that portion of current inflation which was 
unanticipated. 
The tilt problem implies that inflation, even when it is 
anticipated correctly, can have a destabilising impact on the demand 
for housing in the presence of capital market imperfections. If this 
is the case, then there are grounds for claiming that, if some portion 
of the current inflation rate was unanticipated, the overall 
destabilising impact of inflation on the demand for housing may be 
7 
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more serious. 
The argument here is as follows: if inflation is anticipated and 
if potential homebuyers act rationally, inflation will be embodied in 
their propensity to commit funds to the purchase of housing., Hence, 
an increase in the nominal interest rate, which resulted from an 
increase in anticipated inflation, would not come as a surprise. The 
potential homebuyer will be 'surprised' if actual inflation exceeds 
that which was anticipated. By definition, potential homebuyers will 
not have incorporated this unanticipated inflation into their plans. 
It may be that the distinction between anticipated and 
unanticipated inflation is irrelevant when considering mortgagee's 
ex ante decisions whether or not to take on a mortgage. However, e x 
post, unanticipated inflation may itself have serious implications for 
the demand for housing. 
1.2.2 	Non-Price Rationing of Housing Finance 
In the Australian mortgage market, two principal qualifying 
restrictions on the mortgage loan contract are in place. The first 
requires that the initial mortgage payment on a loan be no more than 
a specified proportion of the potential mortgagee's gross income at 
the time of application (25-30 percent at most institutions). The 
second is a limitation on the initial loan-to-value ratio and amounts to 
requirement that the potential mortgagee finance the 
downpayment on a house purchase independently (this is usually 5- 
10 percent of the purchase price of the home). That is, lenders are not 
8 
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prepared to finance more than 90-95 percent of the initial value of 
the house purchase. 3 
The effect of these loan qualifying requirements is, on the 
one hand, to limit the number of homebuyers that qualify for a loan 
at all, since many will be excluded from the mortgage market on the 
basis of their low-income. On the other hand, those homebuyers who 
qualify for a loan are limited in the value of the house that they can 
purchase. 
Credit rationing of this kind has traditionally been seen as a 
disequilibrium phenomenon which persists in the long run when 
interest rates are sticky; for example, when interest rate ceilings are 
imposed [see, for example, Ostas (1976)]. In contrast, the recent credit 
rationing literature has been concerned mainly with equilibrium 
rationing, a situation in which rational lender behaviour is seen as 
consistent with interest rates remaining at a level which implies 
excess demand. 
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) have argued persuasively that, in 
equilibrium, a loan market may be characterised by credit rationing 
because information is imperfect. In relation to the mortgage market, 
Stiglitz and Weiss would argue that, because borrowers who are 
willing to pay a higher rate of interest are likely to have a higher 
risk of default, it may not be profitable for lenders to raise interest 
3 It may be argued that, since deregulation, lenders no longer need to be as 
careful to assess the financial position of the potential mortgagee. The 
responsibility now rests more on the individual for self-assessment. Perhaps 
the recent experience of many Australian homebuyers who, in the face of 
rising mortgage interest rates, are finding themselves overcommitted, is 
testimony to their failure to adequately assess their own repayment capacity. 
9 
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rates. This they describe as the 'adverse selection' aspect of interest 
rates. Hence, even in a fully deregulated market, lenders may 
continue to adopt non-price methods of rationing, using loan 
qualifying requirements to identify "good" borrowers. Nevertheless, 
in a regulated environment the burden of adjustment to excess 
demand must be borne exclusively by this mechanism. 
Taken together, the tilt problem and the non-price rationing 
of home loans militate against the availability and affordability of 
housing finance and, given the importance of mortgage finance to 
the demand for owner-occupied housing, are likely to have an 
associated dampening effect on the demand for houses. The 
incorporation of an "inflation premium" in the mortgage interest 
rate through the tilt problem serves to increase the repayment 
burden of incumbent mortgagees and, for some homebuyers who 
have not yet managed to secure a loan, the increased cost of housing 
capital puts homeownership out of their reach since they would cease 
to qualify for a loan on the basis of an income test. 4 
Given that Australia has recently witnessed high rates of 
inflation and that the dominant mortgage instrument has been the 
SFPM (despite the Campbell Committee's hopes that lenders would 
adopt more innovative lending practices; 1981, p.643) such problems 
may, as Nippard (1986) suggests, have created major "inequities and 
4 For example, in order to secure a SFPM of $70,200 at a nominal interest 
rate of 6 percent, a household would require an annual gross income of at 
least $20,000. At a inflation-induced higher nominal interest rate of 16 
percent, say, the same household would require an annual gross income of 
$39,000 to secure the same $70,200 mortgage. 
1 0 
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inefficiencies" [1986, p.34.]. The inequities are the result of the 
distributional consequences of restricted access to housing finance 
while the inefficiencies are the result of distorted resource flows and 
the consequent increased demands for government subsidies and 
assistance packages. 
These arguments are of particular interest when considered 
in the context of a regulated market. Historically, the objectives of 
imposing interest rate controls have been on the grounds of both 
efficiency and equity. The public interest argument is often used to 
justify intervention on efficiency grounds because the market is 
distorted by lenders' monopolistic or oligopolistic behaviour. Limits 
on interest rates are thought to act as a countervailing force 
increasing the availability of funds towards the optimal level. Equity 
is supposedly served because limits enhance the fairness of the 
distribution of those funds by pricing finance at a level the less well-
off can afford. The arguments above, however, suggest that interest 
rate regulation may fail to meet either the efficiency or equity 
objective. 
1.3 PAST LITERATURE 
Concern about instability in the housing market has originated from 
the American experience of the early to mid '70's when the SFPM was 
seen in an inflationary environment as having "... a serious 
destabilizing impact on both the demand for and supply of housing" 
[Lessard and Modigliani, 1975, p.13]. This led to a search for potential-
solutions to the problem comprising an examination of the possibiltiy 
11 
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of modifying the traditional mortgage or introducing alternative 
mortgage instruments [see Modigliani and Lessard (eds.) „ :1975; Alm 
and Follain, 1984]. 
Researchers in Australia, who also have seen the SFPM as a 
major culprit in the problems of housing affordability have recently 
adopted a similar line of inquiry [Yates, 1983; Nippard, 1986]. 
Although this clearly illustrates a recognition amongst Australian 
commentators of V the ill effects of inflation in a lending environment 
characterized by the SFPM without perfect capital markets, there has 
been no! published attempt to examine whether empirical research in 
Australia can provide evidence of these ill effects. It is useful, 
however, to survey relevant attempts made elsewhere. 
Several writers [Kearl, 1979; Follain, 1982; Schwab, 1982; Alm 
and Follain, 1984] have attempted a quantitative analysis of the effects 
of anticipated inflation on the demand for housing when the SFPM is 
in place. Alm and Follain (1984) in particular, considered explicitly 
the qualifying requirements of the home loan contract discussed 
above. In this American literature it is argued that an increase in the 
rate of anticipated inflation affects housing demand in two offsetting 
ways; 
(i) it reduces the demand for owner-occupied housing 
through the tilt effect; 	and 
(ii) it increases the demand by lowering the real after 
tax user cost of owner-occupied housing as a result 
of the tax system's favourable treatment of owner-•
occupied housing. 5 
5 For an analysis of this effect see Rosen and Rosen (1980). 
12 
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The Australian taxation system does not offer deductability of 
; mortgage interest payments and property taxes as in the USA and, _ 	- I 
therefore, an analysis of the effect of inflation in the Australian 
housing market can safely omit explicit taxation effects. 
For the most part the empirical work on the effects of 
inflation on the demand for owner-occupied housing focuses on the 
concept of the user-cost of owner-occupation, which is analagous to 
Jorgenson's (1963) "user cost of capital" in the neoclassical 
investment literature. 6 The typical approach is as follows: 
(a) integrate into a single measure the various components of 
housing cost, UC; 	nominal interest rates, i , property taxes, 
x, depreciation, d, miscellaneous expenses, m, and nominal 
capital gains, g. 
That is; 	UC =i+x+d+m-g. 
(b) examine the way in which inflation affects this user cost 
measure; 
(c) specify a demand function for owner-occupied housing 
which has as one of its independent variables the user cost 
measure from (a); and 
(d) deduce indirectly, through (b) and (c), the effect of inflation 
on the demand for owner-occupied housing. 
The demand for owner-occupied housing will be inversely related to 
the user cost measure. Hence, if inflation increases the user cost of 
6 Dougherty, A. and Van Order, R. (1982) provided a thorough derivation of 
such a user-cost measure. 
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housing capital, the demand for owner-occupied housing will be 
inversely related to inflation. 
Kearl was the first to examine the implications of (i), above, 
and did so in the climate of the American housing market during the 
early 1970's. The central postulate of Kearl's paper was that SFPM 
contracts, in an inflationary environment, "increase the real cost of 
housing capital, leading to a fall in the demand for housing and a 
reduction in the relative price of housing ceteris paribus" or, as he 
put otherwise, "the cost of capital as usually measured will not fully 
account for the real cost of capital as viewed by the household" [1979, 
p.1116]. 
Kearl specified a model of the housing market which hinged 
on the relationship between the demand for housing services and the 
demand for housing as an asset. Estimation of his model provided 
empirical evidence to support the argument that; 
tf 	 given market imperfections and the 
traditional mortgage instrument, anticipated 
inflation can affect the relative price of 
housing. Ceteris paribus, relative housing 
prices fall during periods of high inflation 
with inflation-induced increases in the initial 
payment shifting demand downward." [1979, 
p.1125] 
suggesting that the effect through (i) is large enough to offset the 
effect via (ii). 
Follain (1982) examined the relative significance of (i) and 
(ii), above, and paid specific attention to the tenure choice of the 
household by estimating jointly a housing demand equation and a 
14 
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tenure choice equation. "The estimates suggest that inflation dampens 
housing demand and homeownership opportunity for most 
households even though the inflation adjusted after-tax cost of 
owner-occupied housing declines as inflation heats up". [1982, p.570] 
Schwab (1982) presented a two-period theoretical model of the 
demand for housing and his simulation study based on this showed 
that "an increase in inflation raises the real cost of housing in the 
first period and lowers the real cost in the second period; the change 
in the demand for housing is the resolution of these two price effects" 
[1982, p.144] and that, with an increase in inflation, only a small loss 
in welfare is incurred. "It would be possible to compensate the 
consumer ... for an increase in expected inflation from 6.0 to 6.6 
percent with a lump sum payment of only $37" [p.144] 
Alm and Follain (1984), using a life-cycle model of household 
choice, presented simulation results which indicated that low or 
moderate rates of inflation (an increase from 0 percent to 5 percent) 
increased the demand for owner-occupied housing but higher rates 
of inflation decreased it. 
The problem with these approaches, as Rosen, et al. (1984) 
have indicated, is that they centre around the construction of a series 
on the user-cost measure with available ex post data. This "implicitly 
assumes that households know the user-cost of housing with 
certainty". 
If 	the ex post user cost measure exhibits 
substantial variability over time, and it is 
highly unlikely 	that individuals believe 
themselves able to forecast these fluctuations 
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with certainty. Since housing decisions are 
usually made over time horizons of several 
years, this uncertainty can have important 
consequences for behavior. Ignoring it can 
lead to incorrect predictions of how people 
will behave under certain conditions." [1984, 
p.405] 
1.4 RECENT LITERATURE AND THE TREATMENT OF 
UNCERTAINTY 
The peculiar features of the housing market, which are central to 
models designed to examine the impact of capital market phenomena 
on it, are that houses are durable assets and, as such, provide both 
consumption and investment services and, further, that they are 
usually purchased with loan finance. 
There are clearly two integrally related aspects of the 
housing market; there is a demand for and a supply of a consumer 
good and an investment good. The consumer good is the flow of 
housing services provided by the existing stock of housing capital, 
and the investment good is the stock of housing capital itself. Any 
household active in the housing market must decide on both the level 
of housing services required for consumption purposes and the stock 
of housing assets to be held for investment purposes. 
As Williams (1984) suggests, "in principle the ,decision of how 
much of housing services to consume is distinct from the decision of 
how much housing to own" (p.144). It is the investment decision 
which will be most heavily influenced by the inflatiohary channels 
outlined in sections 1.2_ and 1.3 above. The subsequent focus of this 
study is, therefore, on the demand for housing as an asset. 
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Implicit in this treatment, however, is the recognition of the 
jointness of the consumption decision. That is, prices and quantities 
of housing seryices and the housing stock demanded need to be 
considered as jointly determined. This notion is developed 
analytically in the theoretical framework of Chapter 2. 
The fixed stock of housing capital at any point in time is an 
asset which must be held in wealth-owners' portfolios. The demand 
for this asset will be a function of wealth and the return on housing 
relative to the return on other assets competing for inclusion in the 
wealth-owners' portfolios. Ii  this decision, the need for a 
model of expectations is clear because of the durability of the housing 
asset. The decision to invest in a house now in order to generate 
future income streams and services streams is based on a set of 
expectations concerning future prices, costs and markets. 
Unfortunately, a major proportion of the research cited above failed 
to incorporate any treatment of uncertainty and expectation 
formation. Rosen, et al. (1984) followed by Goodwin (1986) were the 
first in this strain of research to consider explicitly uncertainty and 
inflation risk. 7 
Rosen, et al. constructed and estimated a model of tenure 
choice which focused on the role of price uncertainty with respect to 
decisions concerning both home rental and home ownership. Their 
approach was to estimate an aggregate model in which the proportion 
of the population that owned homes was a function of the expected 
7 For a lucid exposition on recent developments in economic 	models of 
housing markets see Smith et.al . (1988). 
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real cost of owner occupation, the expected real price of rental 
accommodation and the variation of the actual prices about the 
forecast (the forecast error variances). They constructed series of 
expected housing prices on the basis of the ARIMA forecasting 
procedure suggested by Box and Jenkins (1970) and concluded from 
this approach that previous authors' failure to incorporate 
uncertainty explicitly may have led those authors to overstate the 
taxation effects on tenure chioce (as outlined in Section 1.3, (ii)) and, 
further, that "Estimates on data from 1956-1979 indicate that 
uncertainty over the course of relative prices has significantly 
depressed the aggregate proportion of homeowners" (1984, p.415). 8 
Goodwin (1986) examined the uncertainty issue in testing for 
the existence of hedging motives in owning housing capital. He 
modelled expectations of the future price of housing stock and the 
future price of non-housing goods as a bivariate autoregresssive (AR) 
process. 
Both of these procedures involved calculation of expected 
housing prices/costs on the basis of only past values of the variables 
concerned. This is predicated on the assumption that the price and 
cost variables concerned are exogenous. If this assumption is made 
then the ARIMA and AR(2) processes provide the best linear forecasts 
which may be taken as a proxy for rational expectations. The major 
8 For example, the specific ARIMA (1,1,0) process chosen to make forecasts 
of Pt in year T was: ( Pt Pt -1) = ( (T) Pt-rPt-2)+ ut 	(t=0,...,T-1) 
where P t is the real cost of owner-occupation, u t is a normally distributed 
white noise error and (I)(T) is a parameter to be estimated. Given an estimate of 
4,(T), this equation "can be solved recursively to generate forecasts of 	the 
price of homeownership for as many future years from time T as desired". 
(p.409) 
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point of departure of the present study is to relax this assumption and, 
by so doing, incorporate a rational expectations approach to the 
process of expectation formation. 
1.5 A RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS APPROACH 
Both of the aforementioned authors noted the potential worth of 
formulating a rational expectations (RE) approach to the issue of 
uncertainty, but also suggested that a RE approach would be unlikely 
to yield better forecasts than their simpler approaches. This is indeed 
the case within the confines of their models. Nonetheless, a model 
designed to incorporate a RE approach would allow the uncertain 
variables to be forecast, not only on the basis of the past values of the 
variable in question, but also on the basis of a fully specified model 
incorporating forecasts of the variables exogenous to it. Hence, if we 
have grounds for claiming that housing costs and prices are 
determined endogenously, so too we have grounds for claiming the 
superiority of the rational expectations approach. 
At this stage it is worth mentioning the Lucas (1976) critique. 
The earlier studies cited above would be seen by Lucas as having 
estimated the economic relationships of their housing demand 
models, either incorporating uncertainty or not, and then using 
these relationships to examine or predict behaviour under 
alternative scenarios. This implicitly assumes that the econometric 
relationships remain stable and the associated coefficients remain 
constant under the different scenarios. According to Lucas dynamic 
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economic theory suggests this assumption is false. A new economic 
environment, he argued, would bring with it new behavioural 
relationships as agents adapt to the new environment by changing 
their forecasting schemes. This, in turn, implies that, unless the 
economic environment proceeds in a systemmatic and dynamically-
stable manner, econometricians will be unable to provide much in 
the way of sophisticated policy analysis. 
Invoking the assumption of rational expectations allows 
agents' expectations to be endogenous, but does not allow expectations 
to change as the circumstances governing the variables used to form 
them change. It does not, therefore, overcome the Lucas critique. 
Hence, in using the rational expectations model developed in this 
study to explore the consequences of a changed environment, it must 
still be assumed that the coefficients of the model are invariant to the 
changes. 
Putting this critique in perspective, it would be difficult to 
find an area of econometric work that is not its potential victim. 
Econometric alternatives have been and are being developed but 
these involve complex procedures that are beyond the scope of the 
present study [see 	Wallis, 1980; Hansen and Sargent, 1980; and 
Sargent, 1981]. 9 	Provided that guarded and restricted interpretation 
9 Scarth (1988) has also suggested a way to get around the critique [see pp. 
73-75] but adds the caveat that: 
"This answer to the critique of standard policy analysis is 
adequate as long as the private sector's reaction coefficients 
are themselves assumed to be policy invariant." (p.75) 
From the microeconomic perspective of the current study this is unlikely. 
The concerns herein centre around responses to changes in inflationary 
conditions which have a very direct bearing on agents' demand decisions, 
since they change the constraints agents face. 
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of results is made in the light of new scenarios, models can be useful 
and should not necessarily be condemned as a result of Lucas' 
conclusion. Therefore, as an attempt to solve the problem raised by 
Lucas, this study does little to augment previous studies. It does, 
however, serve as a useful extension to their line of inquiry. 
The difference between the approaches lies in the 
information assumed to be available to agents at the time that 
expectations must be formed. According to Rosen, et al. the "forecasts 
made at any given time are based only on information available at 
that time. (Current year prices are not included in the information 
set, but all lags are.)" [1984, p.408] When expectations are rational, in 
the sense that they represent the true mathematical expectations 
implied by the model, the information set upon which the 
expectations are conditional also includes information about the 
model itself and the expected values of exogenous variables. Agents in 
the RE model are required to make ARIMA forecasts of the exogenous 
variables and then to combine these with a model of asset price 
r -- 
determination; in order to be able to forecast housing costs/prices. 
In its simplest interpretation the RE approach argues that the 
principle of rational behaviour should be applied to expectations 
formation. Economic agents following a maximizing strategy are said 
to gather current and relevant available information and utilise it in 
the most efficient way so as to arrive at an intelligent expectation. 
"The point of departure" suggested Begg; 
"... is that individuals should not make 
systemmatic errors. This does not imply that 
individuals invariably forecast accurately in a 
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world in which some random movements are 
inevitable; rather, the assertion is that guesses 
about the future must be correct on average if 
individuals are to remain satisfied with their 
mechanism of expectations formation." [1982, 
p.29] 
This proposition, under the name of the Efficient Markets (EM) model, 
has for some time served as the foundation of research in financial 
markets. The EM model, in addition to the rational expectations 
hypothesis, asserts that asset prices are freely flexible and reflect all 
available relevant information. 1 
As outlined in Section 1.4, a house is a durable asset and, as 
such yields a flow of services over time and may be purchased in one 
period for resale in a subsequent period. The housing market is also 
speculative in the sense that the expectation of future house prices 
affects the current supply and demand and hence the current 
asset/house price. These two elements, manifested in the jointness of 
the consumption and investment decisions, tailor the housing market 
for an application of the EM hypothesis. 1 1 
As it applies to housing, the EM hypothesis involves two 
components; 
10 Statistical estimation of an EM model reduces the "relevant available 
information" to an information set which includes all lagged values of 
exogenous and endogenous variables of the model, the current period 
forecasts of all exogenous variables and the behavioural relationships of the 
model itself. 
1 1 In a very recent paper, Case and Shiller (1989) found that the market for 
single-family homes in several US cities (Atlanta, Chicago, Dallas and San 
Francisco/Oakland) did not appear to be efficient. There was a profitable 
trading rule to be exploited by persons who were free to time the purchase of 
their homes. The lack of adequate data, however, precludes a direct test of the 
efficiency of the Australian housing market. 
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(1) Expectations are rational in that economic agents are assumed 
to avoid making systemmatic errors in their expectations 
given their current information set. Further in its strict 
interpretation, agents' subjective expectations are given by 
the mathematical conditional expectation derived from the 
formal model. 
(2) Any discrepancy between the expected rates of return on 
housing relative to other assets (with the same degree of risk 
as housing) will be quickly arbitraged so as to eliminate any 
expectation of super-normal profits.' 2 
Taken together, these two components imply the general definitional 
statement that "in an efficient market prices "fully reflect" available 
information" [Fama, 1970, p.384] Or, in the context of the housing 
market; in an efficient housing market the asset price of houses will 
"fully reflect" available information so that if that information was 
available to all participants the asset price of houses would remain 
unaffected. 
Taken in turn, (1) implies that: 
SUBJECTIVE EXPECTATION=  
E [ Pht+ i I S2 t] 
= MATHEMATICAL CONDITIONAL 
EXPECTATION 
12 The existence of transactions costs, carrying costs and tax considerations 
and the fact that a large proportion of the assets being traded are the homes 
that the traders themselves live in, is evidence to suggest it may prove 
difficult for traders to exploit profit opportunities if, and when, they are 
available. In this context it may also be argued that ascertaining the degree of 
risk involved in a house purchase relative to other assets would prove 
difficult. 
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where 	t 	= time period in question; 
Ph t 	= the asset price of housing at time t; 
set of available information at time t; and 
tPhet+1 = the expectation of the asset price of housing in time 
1+1 formed in period t. 
(2) implies that when the asset market for housing clears, 
agents/wealth-owners will be indifferent between holding a house or 
an equivalent-risk asset in their portfolios because the rates of 
return on each will have been arbitraged and will, therefore, be the 
same. 
For clarification, consider a simple model of the asset demand 
for housing such that the asset price in any period is determined by 
the interaction of the demand for housing assets/units and their 
supply. The current asset price, Ph t will adjust so as to induce wealth-
holders to hold the existing stock of housing units, H, in their 
portfolios. This is the price that equates the expected return on 
housing with the return on other assets of equivalent risk. Clearly, 
given the nature of the decision of how many housing units to hold 
for investment purposes, the quantity of housing units demanded in 
the period will also be a function of the expected future asset prices. 
That is, expected future prices, among other things, determine the 
position of the current asset demand and supply functions and, 
therefore, the current asset price. 
For example, consider a simple model of the form: 
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Qd t = f (Phi, Phet+ i, exog.) 
Qs t = g { Pht , Phet+ i, exog.) 
Phet+ 1 = h { Phi, exog.}, 
where 'exog' is some vector of exogenous variables. Equilibrium (Qdt = 
Qst) determines Ph i , but Qdt and Qst are themselves determined by 
Ph e t+ 1,  the asset price that is expected to clear the housing asset 
market in the next period, which will, in turn, be a function of the 
asset price that is expected to clear the market in the following 
period. Phe +l thus becomes the variable that must be forecast using 
rational expectations so that, in the efficient housing asset market, 
the current price reflects all available information. 
1.6 THE SCOPE OF THIS STUDY 
Combining the discussion in sections 1.1 to 1.5 provides an outline of 
the concerns and scope of this study. First, the problems of interest 
are the potential inflationary distortions to the housing market 
through the tilt problem and the non-price rationing of mortgage 
funds. Given that these problems manifest themselves in the market 
for housing finance, attention is focused on the demand for housing 
as an asset. This approach is reasonable on the assumption that the 
discounted flow of the value of housing services is equal to the asset 
value, which governs the investment decision. 
The incorporation of an explicit treatment of uncertainty in 
this study is of utmost importance. Attempts to do so to date have failed 
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to recognise the endogeneity of housing costs and prices. By applying 
the EM model to the asset demand for housing, uncertainty is analysed 
within a model that is designed to allow the current asset price to be 
determined in response to expectations of future asset prices as well 
as information gathered about the past. The model developed in 
Chapters 2 and 3 will allow presentation of some dynamic results that 
may assist in quantifying the effects of inflation on the asset demand 
for housing. 
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2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Presented in this chapter is an outline of the theoretical framework 
through which the impact of inflation on the relative price of 
houses, and the size of the housing capital stock, may be analysed. 
Specifically, the consequences of inflation for the user-cost of 
owner-occupied housing as well as the tilt problem outlined in 
Chapter One may be examined. 
The model outlined below draws together features of models 
developed by Kearl (1979), Poterba (1984), Goodwin (1986), 
Manchester (1987) and Male (1988). Poterba developed an asset-
market model of the American market for owner-occupied housing. 
This model is adapted to suit a study of the Australian housing market 
and is then augmented to incorporate explicitly a channel through 
which inflation leads to a tilt effect. The two variables that Kearl used 
to capture the effects of the mortgage instrument are used, as• they 
were by Goodwin in his study of inflation-hedging motives in 
housing demand. 
2.2 THE ASSET-MARKET MODEL 
As noted in Chapter One, a house is a durable asset that yields a stream 
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of returns (housing services) to its owner. Housing demand is 
influenced by the level of returns in each period and by expected 
future returns. The housing asset price will then be determined at 
equilibrium, when quantity demanded equals quantity supplied. 
2.2.1 	The Market for Housing Services 
Housing in this market is generally conceived as an unobservable 
homogeneous commodity called housing services. One homogeneous 
unit of housing stock is assumed to yield a one unit flow of housing 
services per time period so that houses differ only in the quantity of 
housing services which they possess and provide. As Sheffrin 
suggests "one should think in terms of the fiction that there is 
actually a rental market for owner-occupied housing" [1983, p.171] 
Hence, one can think in terms of a rental demand price for the 
housing services that are derived from a stock of units of owner-
occupied housing. Equilibrium in the market for housing services 
will determine the equilibrium value of this rental demand price for 
a unit of housing. 
The demand for housing services, Hsd, has traditionally been 
expressed as a function of the rental demand price of housing 
services (R), income (y), an index of prices of other commodities (P), 
and a vector of household characteristics, (hh). 1 So that: 
Hsd = 4)(R, y, P, hh) 
This is a Marshallian demand function which could be derived from a 
1 This is actually Kearl's specification but can be taken to be a general 
representation of the specifications that follow him in the literature. Most 
authors cited have used an adaptation of Kearl's model. 
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constrained household utility maximisation problem in which 
housing services appear as an argument in the utility function and 
housing expenditure is included as a term in the budget constraint. 
For example, in Male (1988), a household is assumed to maximise 
utility over some fixed time horizon, subject to an intertemporal 
budget constraint. Utility in any period depends on the housing 
consumption, H, and non-housing consumption, C, of the household. 
Thus, total utility is the discounted present value of utility in each 
period: 2 
V =E f(i+t) -1 ) t-1 U(Ct, H) I 
where 	= is the household's total utility over its finite time horizon; 
N = the number of years in the household's planning horizon; 
an d 	t = the household's pure rate of time preference. 
- 
Total utility is maximised subject to a budget constraint which, 
abstracting from bequests, requires that the present value of income 
be equal to the present value of expenditures on housing (including 
capital gains) and non-housing consumption. [Appendix B is devoted 
to a simplified two-period example of this type of problem to 
demonstrate the procedure underlying the derivation of the 
Marshallian demand functions] 
This analysis is extended in Male (1988) to allow for capital 
market imperfections whereby additional constraints reflect the 
limits placed on households through the non-price rationing of 
2  The stock of H units of housing are assumed to provide a flow of housing 
services that is a constant proportion of that stock over time, so that H itself 
appears in the household utility function. 
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mortgage funds and the fact that households cannot borrow in the 
current period against anticipated increases in real income [see also 
Schwab, 1982 and Alm and Follain, 19841. Manchester (1987) captured 
these features in her credit availability variable, CA, and vector of 
mortgage characteristics, M, respectively, which appeared in her 
specification of the flow demand function for housing services. 3 By 
combining both Kearl's and Manchester's specifications, the demand 
for housing services may be written as: 
Hsd = (1)(R, y, P. hh, CA, M) 	 ( 2 . 1 ) 
On the supply side, the stock of housing capital, H, that exists 
at any point in time will provide a flow of housing services, Hss. This 
flow, again following Kearl, may be assumed to be proportional to the 
stock. Thus: Hss = a H 
or more simply, by setting a =1; 
Hss= H 	 (2.2) 
Since, in the short run, the stock of housing is fixed, the flow of 
services from this stock is supplied inelastically and the rental price 
3 Manchester includes further influences on housing demand; 
"Further influences on housing 	demand include the 
demographic composition D of households in a local 
area, the quality and quantity of local services S 
provided by the municipal government to its residents, 
and perhaps the effect of climate differences in 
affecting the demand for housing as measured by 
heating degree days HD and cooling degree days CD." 
[1987, p.107] 
but such considerations are beyond the scope and the primary focus of this 
study. 
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that is assumed to clear the services market is demand-determined. 
That is, equilibrium in the market for housing services requires that 
the rental demand price adjusts freely to equate demand for services 
with the stock. 
From equations (2.1) and (2.2) equilibrium implies: 
Hss = Hsd 
or 	H= 	( R, y, P, hh, CA, M ) 
and the market clearing rental demand price may be written as: 
R = R ( H, y, P, hh, CA, M ) 	 (2.3) 
which is the inverse of the Marshallian demand function for housing 
services. 4 
It may at first seem misleading to include credit variables like 
I CA and M in the services demand function since, prima facie, such variables 
affect the ability to 'own' housing rather than the ability to 'rent' 
housing. Given that this study focuses on the housing market as an 
asset market it is indeed concerned with the decision to own the asset 
housing. Notwithstanding this focus two integrally related housing 
markets have been identified: the market for a consumption good, - 
housing services; and the market for an investment good, housing 
stock. The implicit starting point is concerned with households or 
4 This is a common specification of the inverse of the Marshallian demand 
curve, in which demand determinants, other than the price of the good being 
considered, are implicitly treated as given. Thus, in the present example; y, P, 
hh, CA and M are given. Kohli (1986), however, has argued that, since inverse 
demand functions express prices as a function of quantities, a preferable 
specification of the inverse of the Marshallian demand curve would treat the 
quantities of other goods as exogenous and their prices as endogenous, rather 
than the reverse. 
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individuals considering the purchase of a housing asset. They wish to 
purchase that asset because it provides a flow of services which 
command a rental demand price and because it offers future capital 
gains as an investment good. 5 
A rational homebuyer, as an owner-occupier, should equate 
the price• of a house with the present discounted value of its future 
service stream. A rational homebuyer, intending to rent out the 
property, should equate the price of the house with the present 
discounted value of the future rental income stream. Either way, the 
rental demand price determined in the market for housing services 
will, when equilibrium prevails in the asset market, adjust to equal 
the rental cost of housing (as developed in Section 2.2.2 below). 
The owner-occupiers are, in principle, deciding on their 
demand for housing services on the basis that those services are to be 
supplied by the housing asset (stock of units of housing) they own. 
Therefore, the amount of housing stock that has been demanded for 
investment purposes will be a factor that determines the household's 
demand for housing services. Or as Struyk (1976) puts it: 
"The proposition is that given some level of stock has 
been demanded and obtained for investment 
purposes, its availability may affect the observed 
quantity of housing services demanded. The 
household in question may actually be consuming 
more or less services than it would in the absence of 
the investment consideration" [Struyk, 1976, p.28] 
It is this proposition that justifies the inclusion of CA and M in the 
5  The rental demand price is an imputed rent to an owner-occupier and a 
market rent if the property is rented out. 
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inverse demand function. From the perspective of the individual 
purchasing a housing asset as a rental property, his/her expected 
future rental income stream will be also determined by his/her 
financial constraints. 
The analysis of the housing market developed above is an 
equilibrium model since, at every moment, wealth-owners are willing 
to hold the existing stock of housing (prices change to ensure 
markets clear). The major concern is to explain the determination of 
the asset price of housing. The demand for housing services may not 
be reflected in the asset price if the household faces liquidity 
constraints or credit rationing. Hence, the model must incorporate a 
mechanism through which demand is limited through these features 
of the finance market. Essentially, what is suggested is that, if 
households are constrained in how much housing they can own, then 
they are constrained in the flow of housing services they can 
demand; either to provide an imputed rent to owner-occupation or a 
market rent. Alternatively, the constraints in the market for housing 
finance may be thought of as indicating a household's effective 
demand for housing services vis-a-vis its notional demand. 6 
2.2.2 	The Demand for the Stock of Housing 
A utility maximising household or individual would, as Poterba 
suggests; "consume housing services until the marginal value of 
6 The tenure choice problem is simplified by assuming that, in 	equilibrium, 
the rental demand prices to owner-occupiers and landlords are equalised. This 
may not be the case if owner-occupiers are seen to pay a premium for the 
"glow of ownership". 
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these services equals their cost." [1984, p.731] In the context of the 
fictional rental market for owner-occupied housing this implies that, 
to ensure equilibrium, the rental demand price of a unit of housing, 
determined in Section 2.2.1, will equate to the rental cost of providing 
a unit of housing. That is, an individual owner-occupier will be 
content to "rent" his house for a year only if it provides him with the 
flow of services he demands over that year. The task in this section is 
to explain what determines the rental cost. 
The preferred approach, outlined in Section 1.3, is to focus on 
the concept of the user-cost of owner-occupation,. which integrates 
into a single measure, UC, the various components of housing cost. It 
can be thought of as the cost, expressed as a proportion of the asset 
price, of buying a housing asset, holding it for - a• year and then 
selling it at the end of the year. Hence, the rental cost price of a stock 
of units of housing may be posited as Ph.UC where Ph is the real asset 
price of housing. 
The user-cost measure can be disaggregated into five 
components; the nominal mortgage interest rate, i, the rate of 
property tax liabilites incurred, x, the rate of depreciation of the 
house, d, miscellaneous expenses including mainmnance and 
also expressed as a proportion of - asset price, 1 
repairs, ,  m, and the - rate at which nominal capital gains may accrue 
(the expected rate of nominal house price inflation), g. The yearly 
7 The underlying assumption here is that the asset price of a house (more 
simply, the purchase price of a home) bears a direct correspondence to the 
number of homogeneous units of housing that it possesses and, in turn, its 
potential to provide a flow of housing services. A rational homebuyer should 
equate the price of a house with the present value of its future service 
stream. 
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cost of housing services provided by a stock of housing units•
purchased at a real price" Ph is written: 
Ph.UC = Ph.[ + x + d+m - g] 
but this assumes that individuals are free to borrow and lend at the 
same nominal interest rate so that i represents both the cost of 
mortgage finance and the opportunity cost of housing equity 
acquisition. If these two rates are unequal, then the initial loan-to-
value ratio, L, (the proportion of Ph financed through mortgage 
finance) must enter the specification of the user cost. 8 Hence: 
Ph.UC = Ph.[ Lib +(l -L)io +x+d+m - g] 
where i b is the nominal cost of mortgage finance (the nominal 
mortgage interest rate) and io is the opportunity cost of housing 
equity. 9   
This is an after-tax user cost measure which differs from the 
after-tax user cost measures found in the literature cited [see also; 
Rosen and Rosen (1980) and Follain (1982)1 in that it does not include 
; 
tax rate terms. As noted in Section 1.3, under US tax law, homeowners 
are permitted to deduct mortgage interest payments from their 
taxable income, and some operating expenses are treated as tax 
allowances. This effectively reduces the real cost of home-ownership 
and a tax rate term is included in the user cost measure to allow for 
this. 	The Australian taxation system does not, however, make these 
_ 
8 Through the nominal mortgage 	interest rate term, i, the assumption of 
the importance of mortgage finance to 	facilitate owner-occupation is 
implicit. 
9 Poterba (1984) suggests this extension to the problem in fn.6, p.732. 
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allowances. 	In neither the US or Australian taxation systems are 
imputed rental income or the capital gains from home ownership 
taxed. This favourable tax treatment is retained in the present user-
cost measure. 
The basis of Poterba's study of real house price changes was to 
disaggregate the rate of nominal house price inflation and this line 
of inquiry is followed here. The nominal house price inflation rate, 
g , is defined as the sum of the expected rate of general price 
inflation, pe, and the rate of real house price inflation which may be 
expressed as Ph'/Ph, where Ph (= dPh/dt) is the time derivative of 
prices. Thus: 
UC = [Lit' + (1 -L)i0 + x + d + m - ( e + Ph./Ph)] 	(2.4) 
Equilibrium in the asset market for housing requires that the rental 
demand price (services price) for a unit of housing equals the s „ 
rental cost of providing an additional unit of housing. That is, in each 
period: 
R = Ph.UC 
to ensure equilibrium prevails in the asset market. This is analagous 
to the analysis presented by Kearl (1979) and Manchester (1987) who 
suggested that, given the rental demand price and the cost of 
housing capital, the observed point on the current asset demand 
function for owner-occupied housing would always be determined, in 
the context of the variables defined above, as: 
Ph = R/UC 
provided that the components of user-cost can be viewed as 
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exogenous to the housing sector. The relationship may be rewritten 
as a differential equation in the asset price of 'housing. From (2.3) and 
(2.4): 
R(H, y, P. hh, CA, M) = Ph.[Lib+( 1-L)io+ x + d + m- (ite +Ph'/Ph)] 
= Ph.[Lib+( 1 -L)io+ x + d + m- ice] - Ph' 
= Ph.UC' - Ph' 
Ph' = - R( ) + Ph.UC' (2.5) 
where 	 UC' = UC + Ph'/Ph 
The dynamic behaviour of Ph therefore depends on the relationship 
between R and Ph.UC'. It follows that Ph changes only when there is 
some discrepancy between the rental demand price and the net rental 
cost price of owner-occupied housing, Ph.UC'. That is, Ph changes 
only when either R<Ph.UC' or R>Ph.UC', implying that, in equilibrium, 
Ph adjusts to induce optimising wealth-owners to be just willing to 
hold the existing stock of housing in their portfolios. 
CASE 1: Ph.UC>R 
In the present model, agents make rational forecasts of future asset 
prices and these forecasts will influence the current asset price of 
housing. 1 0 The information set available to agents includes all lags, a 
model of the economic structure which affects them and expected 
values of the variables exogenous to the model. The maintained 
1 0 Alternatively, agents can be thought of as forecasting their demand for 
housing services in each period. 
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hypothesis that incumbent owner-occupiers remain content to "rent" 
their housing assets under circumstances when Ph.UC 1>R predicates a 
testable hypothesis that they must be anticipating rising prices and 
thus Ph.>0.1 1  If agents possess perfect foresight, then the actual 
change in real house prices will be equal to what was anticipated. If 
agents have rational expectations, then these will be correct 'on 
average'. Either way, if the current asset price is influenced by 
expectations of future asset prices, and if the components of UC' are 
determined outside the housing market, then the implied hypothesis 
is that agents are anticipating rising prices and are expecting capital 
gains to accrue to them. 
CASE 2: ph.uc<R 
The maintained hypothesis that more wealth-owners are not induced 
to enter the market for owner-occupied housing under circumstances 
when Ph.UCt<R predicates a testable hypothesis that agents are 
anticipating falling prices and thus Ph .<0. The expectation of capital 
losses discourages agents from entering the market for owner-
occupied housing. 
The hypotheses in the present rational expectations 
framework, therefore, are that the rate of change of Ph will be 
positive when Ph.UCI>R and negative when Ph.UC'<R. This implies that 
1 1 The maintained hypothesis is that agents act in a way that is consistent 
with their forming expectations of future house prices 	rationally. If agents rhave jincomplete or insufficient information they 	may be discouraged from 
-"Seeking owner-occupation by a relatively 	high rental cost price (CASE 1: 
Ph.UC'>R) or induced into seeking owner-occupation 	by a relatively low 
rental cost price (CASE 2: Ph.UC<R). 
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the expected accrual of capital gains (or losses respectively) is 
enough to influence agents' current demand decisions and is borne 
out in the specification of equation (2.5). 
Testing the null hypothesis 
H1: Ph.>0 when Ph.UC5R 
against the alternative 
HA I: Ph.< 0 
and the null hypothesis 
H2: Ph .<0 when Ph.UC'<R 
against the alternative 
HA2: Ph.> 0 
can be regarded as a test of the validity of modelling the housing asset 
market under rational expectations. 
2.2.3 	The Supply of Housing Capital 
In Sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 the demand for the existing stock of 
housing units was described. The task now is to analyse the evolution 
of that stock over time; that is, the amount of gross residential 
investment. 
Since Ph is the real price at which builders can sell new units 
of housing stock, Ph can be assumed to regulate the rate of new 
housing production, NH (gross housing investment): NH = f(Ph); f>0. 
This assumption suggests that, as the real asset price of housing 
increases, more resources will be allocated to the production of 
housing and the stock will increase. Gross housing investment will be 
depleted by the rate of depreciation of the existing stock, dH. Hence, 
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the stock of housing units will increase over time (net housing 
investment) by the extent to which NH exceeds dH. Thus: 
H. = NH - dH 
= f(Ph) - dH; 	f>0 	 (2.6) 
which is a differential equation in the stock of housing, taken 
directly from Poterba's model, where H • (= dH/dt) is the time 
derivative of the housing stock. 
The way in which this treatment of the supply side will be 
utilised in the present study has one limitation. Construction firms 
are implicitly modelled as having upward-sloping marginal cost 
curves and as making construction decisions simply on the basis of 
the current price of their output. Thus, the supply side is modelled as 
static whilst, at the same time, much attention has been given to 
modelling the demand side as dynamic, with households being made 
up of forward-looking agents. Although there are clear benefits in 
both consistency and completeness to formulate a model that has both 
a rich demand side and a rich supply side it would be very difficult to 
do so. 
Poterba was able to explore a dynamic version of the supply 
side, allowing construction decisions to be based upon expectations of 
the prices that will prevail in the future, by making use of demand 
side parameters estimated in other US studies. The data necessary for 
such an approach are not available for Australia, and, given the focus 
of the present study, a simplified treatment of the supply side is not 
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considered to be a major drawback. 
Equations (2.5) and (2.6) represent a system of differential 
equations in two endogenous variables, Ph and H: 
Ph = -R(H, y, P. hh, CA, M) + Ph[Lib+ (1-L)i 0 + x+d+ m- ire] 
(2.5) 
11 . = f(Ph) - dH 	 (2.6) 
which may be used to analyse the consequences for Ph and H of an 
increase in the expected rate of inflation. There are two avenues 
through which these consequences may be experienced. First, an 
increase in anticipated inflation will lead to an increase in the rental 
cost price of owner-occupied housing by increasing the nominal 
interest rates that appear in the user-cost measure. Second, since 
mortgage characteristics have been included through the liquidity 
constraints and credit availability variables in the rental demand 
price, allowance is also made for anticipated inflation to increase the 
rental demand price of owner-occupied housing. This second avenue 
will be tailored to an analysis of the tilt problem. 
2.3 THE PERFECT FORESIGHT EQUILIBRIUM PATH 
Equation (2.5) incorporates the assumption of perfect foresight since 
the actual rate of change of real house prices is assumed to be equal to 
the anticipated rate of real house price inflation component of user-
cost in equation (2.4). In the simple two-equation model there are two 
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endogenous variables; the asset price of housing and the size of the 
housing stock. The rates of change of both of these endogenous 
I variables depend on their levels. Thus, (2.5) and (2.6) may be 
represented diagrammatically in (Ph,H) space. 
When there is no anticipated change in Ph then Ph • =0. The 
combinations of Ph and H that are consistent with Ph • =0 will define a 
locus of points that are consistent with steady-state equilibrium in 
the asset market for owner-occupied housing. This locus defines the 
current demand curve for housing units, when agents do not expect 
any capital gains (or losses) to arise from home ownership. The 
reasoning here comes from interpreting equation (2.5) as 
determining the rate of anticipated real capital gains necessary to 
induce wealth owners to hold the entire housing stock. Ph • = 0 
implies, from (2.5): 
Ph.UC = R( H, 	) 
That is, combinations of Ph and H that will satisfy this relationship 
will imply Ph • =0. 
Assuming that the marginal value of a unit of housing 
services declines as the stock of housing expands, the rental demand 
price will be negatively related to the stock of housing and the 
(Ph • =0) locus will be downward-sloping. Neoclassical microeconomics 
is not in conflict with this assumption. 
Holding Ph constant in (2.5), and considering a larger H value 
(a horizontal shift to the right of the ((Ph • =0) locus in Figure 2.1) 
implies a fall in R and, since R<0, Ph• >0 and Ph is rising. Hence, to 
the right of (Ph• =0), Ph is rising. Similarly, holding Ph constant and 
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considering a smaller H value (a horizontal shift to the left of the 
(Ph • =0) locus) Ph• <0 and Ph is falling. Hence, to the left of (Ph • =0), 
Ph is falling. These results are depicted by the arrows of motion 
around the (Ph • =0) locus. The (Ph• =0) locus is illustrated in Figure 
2.1. 
Ph 
FIGURE 2.1 
Arrows of Motion around the Ph•=3 locus 
These arrows of motion, and the dynamic evolution of the housing 
market that they will imply, are derived in the context of the present 
rational expectations framework. That is, it is hypothesised that, if the 
rental cost were to exceed the rental demand price, then the change 
in asset prices would be positive and vice versa. 
From (2.6), the (11• =0) locus is drawn in Figure 2.2 as upward-
sloping by virtue of the fact that new housing construction is a 
positive function of the price of housing. The combinations of Ph and 
H that are consistent with =0 define a locus of points that are 
consistent with a constant stock of housing. The (H • =0) locus is 
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illustrated in Figure 2.2. Holding Ph constant and considering a 
larger H value (a horizontal shift to the right of the (11 . =0) locus in 
Figure 2.2) 	implies, since d>0, that 1-1. <0 and H is falling. Hence, to 
the right of (1.1"=0), H is falling. 	Similarly, holding Ph constant and 
considering a smaller H value implies that 	H. >0 and H is rising. 
Hence, to the left of (H".0), H is rising. 
Ph 
FIGURE 2.2 
Arrows of Motion around the le=0 locus 
Combining the arrows of motion derived in Figures 2.1 and 2.2 yields 
the complete phase diagram shown in Figure 2.3. The steady-state, 
(Ph*, H*), is the point of intersection of the two loci at which both Ph 
and H are unchanging. When the economy is not in steady-state, the 
two loci divide the possible outcomes into four regions, each with an 
associated pair of arrows for the direction of change of Ph and H. 
Since the actual changes in Ph and H must satisfy both sets of arrows, 
the evolution of the housing market may be inferred. 
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A 
  
H* 
FIGURE 2.3 
Phase Diagram 
The appropriate arrows of motion point always towards the (H=O) 
locus and away from the (Pe=0) locus implying the steady-state is a 
"saddlepoint". The peculiarity of what is termed "saddlepoint 
instability" is that there exists a unique convergent path to the 
steady-state. This path is labeled in Figure 2.3 as the stable arm AB. If 
a steady-state is disturbed, it will only be restored if the economy 
begins at a point along AB. Except for disturbances of immense 
magnitude, convergence along this path is guaranteed with the 
assumption of perfect foresight or, more generally, rational 
expectations. The source of the saddlepoint instability lies in the 
assumption of perfect foresight of capital gains and losses. This 
assumption implies that high housing prices require prices to be 
rising and low prices require prices to be falling in order for the 
rental market to be in equilibrium. 
With this background it is now appropriate to examine the 
dynamics of the housing market described by the above model. 
Chapter 3 is devoted to this task. 
Ph 
Ph* 
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CHAPTER THREE: Dynamics 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter the task is to analyse the impact of an increase in the 
rate of anticipated inflation and to describe its ultimate consequences 
for the housing market modelled in Chapter 2. The question to answer 
is "What are the steady-state effects of an increase in the rate of 
anticipated inflation?" Since there are several ways in which 
inflation and inflationary expectations enter the model, an 
unravelling of the various channels is necessary. This also serves to 
extend the model in preparation for its estimation in Chapter 4. 
3.2 	INFLATIONARY CHANNELS 
3.2.1 	Channel One: Mortgage Characteristics 
The model developed in Chapter 2 identifies two channels through 
which a change in anticipated inflation can affect the demand for 
housing. The first channel is through the mortgage characteristics, 
M, of the inverse demand function of Section 2.2.1. This variable 
captures the distortions induced by the structure of the Standard 
Fixed Payment Mortgage (SFPM). The two variables that Kearl (1979) 
used to describe the mortgage instrument effects were also used by 
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Goodwin (1986) and shall be retained here. 1 M is disaggregated into 
MP and DN. MP  represents the initial payment on a SFPM and DN the 
effective duration of the payment stream. These will be considered in - 
turn. 
MP measures the initial mortgage payment and is intended to 
describe the 'tilt' effect discussed in Section 1.2.1. It may be expressed 
as: 
MP = Ph.L.ib/ [1-(1) -T] 	 (3.1) 
where Ph, L, and i b are as defined above and T is the term of the 
loan (or amortisation period) in years. 2 A priori, through the  
variable MP. an increase in anticipated inflation. ceteris paribus. is  
expected to reduce the current demand for housing. To recap, the 
inflation premium in the nominal mortgage interest rate will tilt the 
distribution of the real payment stream towards the beginning of the 
amortisation period. It is argued that, even if inflation is perfectly 
anticipated by households, their demand for housing will be affected 
adversely because they cannot trade future income for current 
expenditures either perfectly or costlessly. Buyers will be unable to 
exercise their notional demand for housing and, in the presence of 
non-price rationing, the availability as well as the affordability of 
finance may be restricted. 
1 	Note that Poterba acknowledges this inflationary channel although 
examination of it was beyond the scope of his paper. [1984, p.731, fn.3] 
2 This initial payment is calculated from the constant nominal payment on 
an annuity of term T where the amount of the housing loan represents the 
present value of the annuity. [see Appendix A] 
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DN is the "Macaulay duration" applied to the stream of 
mortgage payments. Macaulay suggested studying the time structure 
of a bond by measuring its average term to maturity or "duration". 
The resultant duration measure is the weighted average number of 
years until the cash flows on a bond occur, in which the relative 
present values of each cash payment are used as the weights. When 
applied to a SFPM, it can be thought of, as Kearl suggested, "as the 
elasticity of present value of a stream of payments with respect to the 
discount rate employed to calculate the present value." [1979, p.112, 
fn.5] In terms of the variables defined above, DN may be expressed as: 
DN = 	( [ t. AP(1+ib)t]/[i AP(14-ib)t] ) 
tze t.. 
(3.2) 
where AP is the annual payment on the SFPM. 
Since, with a SFPM, the nominal payment is constant, the 
duration is a function of the amortisation period, T, and the nominal 
mortgage interest rate, ib • With an increase in anticipated inflation, 
which increases the initial payment on the mortgage and tilts the 
real payment stream, the mortgage will be paid off more rapidly and 
its effective duration, as defined by the variable DN, will fall. Since 
this means that a household's real equity in its home will grow more 
rapidly, the shorter duration may be expected to increase current 
housing demand or a least to, in part, offset the effects through MP. 
Thus, through the variable DN an increase in anticipated inflation, 
ceteris paribus. is expected to increase the current demand for 
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housing. 
The relative impacts of inflation through MP and DN are not 
obvious. Goodwin (1986) discovered that both were significantly 
different from zero (in a statistical sense) and quantitatively large in 
their influence but that the duration effect only partially offset the 
tilt effect. Goodwin's study was consistent with the body of literature 
which suggests that, in an inflationary environment, the 
institutional features in the market for housing finance adversely 
affect housing demand. It also confirmed the results presented in 
Kearl's earlier study [see Kearl, 1979,p.1125]. 
In sum, previous evidence suggests that the , tilt effect, 
through MP, outweighs the duration effect, through DN, and Lke 
resolution of these two effects leads to a dampening of current  
housing demand through the first inflationary channel.  Given the 
inverse demand function for housing services in equation (2.3), this 
reduction in demand implies a fall in the rental demand price for 
housing, ceteris paribus. 
3.2.2 	Channel Two: Homeowner's User Costs 
The second inflationary channel comes through homeowner's user 
costs. In Poterba's analysis, higher anticipated inflation rates reduced 
rhomeo wners' Ireal user costs owing to the tax subsidy to owner-
occupation. For example, redefining the simple, single interest rate, 
user cost measure as (see section 2.2.2): 
UC=[ (1-e)(i+x)+d+m-g] 
where e is the marginal income tax rate, allows for the deductability 
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of property taxes, x, and mortgage interest payments from the 
homeowner's taxable income. Differentiating this expression with 
respect to the inflation rate yields: 
dUC/dic = (1-0) di/drc - dg/dic 
where 	g = 	- Pe/Ph. 
Hence: 	 dg/dic = cl7t e/d7c + d( Ph./Ph)/clic . 
Since, in the steady-state, real house prices are constant, 
d( Ph. /Ph)/dic = 
and 
	
dg/dic = clice/dic = 1. 
Thus: 	 dUC/clit = (1-8) di/dit - 1 
and 	 dUC/drc <0 iff (1-8) di/dic < 1 
or, equivalently, 	 iff 	diftln < 1/(1.0). 
Since 	0<8<1, 1/(1-8)>1 and this implies that if nominal interest rates 
rise by less than 11(1-8) percent for every one percent increase in 
the rate of inflation, then an increase in the rate of anticipated 
inflation will reduce the real user cost of home ownership. The lower 
user cost leads to a greater demand for housing at each real asset 
price. 3 
In the present model, however, the picture is different since, 
3 Poterba tests the responsiveness of the nominal mortgage interest 	rate to 
expected inflation and finds that he cannot reject the hypothesis that d i/dit = 
1 and therefore imposes that value in his simulations. As detailed in Appendix 
t, such evidence was not obtained in the present study. 
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in Australia, interest payments and property taxes are not 
permissable tax deductions. The user cost expression in equation (2.4) 
is: 
UC = i + (1 -L)i0 +x + d + m - ( ice + Ph'/Ph)] 
Differentiating with respect to inflation: 
dUC/dit = L.dib/dic + (1-L).di0/dic - dg/dic 
where, as above, g = ne - Pe/Ph and dg/d7c = 1. 
This implies: 	dUC/thr = {L.dibidn + (1 -L).di0/d7c} - 1 
so 	dUC/d/c > 0 iff (L.dib/dir + (1-L).di0/d7c) > 1, 
and 	dUC/dir <0 iff {L.didcin + (1 -L).di0/dir} < 1. 
Clearly, in the present case, unless the effect of inflation on nominal 
interest rates can be determined, the issue of whether user cost rises 
or falls in response to an increase in inflation cannot be resolved. 
3.3 EVIDENCE ON THE FISHER HYPOTHESIS 
The best known theory of how inflation affects nominal interest rates 
is the Fisher (1954) hypothesis; that in the long term, the real rate of 
return on capital is approximately constant and the nominal rate 
fluctuates point-for-point with inflation. Thus the Fisher hypothesis 
would predict di/dn =1. The difficulty in obtaining a series on the 
most important (and unobservable) explanatory variable, anticipated 
inflation, has traditionally hampered empirical work designed to test 
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this hypothesis. In one recent paper, by Paul Volker (1981), this 
obstacle was addressed with the emergence of new survey data on 
price expectations. 4 
Volker 	investigated 	the 	importance 	of inflationary 
expectations in the determination of the nominal interest rate on 90- 
day commercial bills. He rigorously estimated a wide range of models 
over the period 1968:1 to 1979:2 and his results indicated that 
inflationary expectations, as depicted by the survey-based variable, 
although significant, were only incorporated in the nominal rate to a 
small extent. He found liquidity conditions to have been the major 
determinant of short-term interest rates in the sample period. These 
results appear to be inconsistent with the Fisher hypothesis. 
In a more recent paper Carmichael and Stebbing (1983) 
claimed that much of the empirical work on the Fisher hypothesis 
had been misleading. They offered an alternative hypothesis which 
they called the "inverted Fisher hypothesis" suggesting that the 
nominal rate of interest, and not the real rate, is approximately 
constant in the long run, with the real rate moving inversely point-
for-point with inflation. They tested this hypothesis for Australia 
using data on the 90-day commercial bill rate and a five-year 
industrial debenture yield and found strong support for the inverted 
Fisher hypothesis for both rates; results that, by definition, are 
4 The inflationary expectations variable was supplied by the Reserve Bank 
and was based on the Carlson and Parkin (1975) method of converting 
qualitative survey responses into a quantitative series. The survey responses 
were from the ACMA-Bank of NSW survey. There is much debate, however, 
about the usefulness of such survey data. 
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inconsistent with the Fisher hypothesis. 	However, Groenewold (1989) 
argued that the estimating equations employed by Carmichael and 
Stebbing were misspecified because the .determinants of the nominal 
interest rate were supressed. Groenewold presented results, based on 
an explicit short-run open economy macroeconomic model, which 
were inconsistent with the inverted Fisher hypothesis. 
A resolution of the validity or otherwise of the Fisher 
hypothesis for Australia is well beyond the scope of this study. The 
freer capital market that has emerged subsequent to the deregulation 
of the Australian financial system (as recommended by the Campbell 
Report (1981)) has brought with it a new climate in which interest 
rates are determined. Perhaps inflationary expectations are now 
reflected in movements in nominal interest rates to a larger extent. 
Nonetheless, until very recently, the institutional arrangements that 
have governed the Australian mortgage market suggest that it is 
likely that nominal mortgage interest rates would, in any case, have 
been less sensistive to inflationary expectations than purely market-
determined rates. 5 Figure 3.1, below, illustrates that since 1970 the 
government ceiling on (savings banks) mortgage rates has 
frequently been binding. 
5 	Again, reference is made here to the Australian government's policy 
initiative to remove the mortgage 	interest rate ceiling on new housing loans 
made after April 1986. 
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FIGURE 3.1 
Comparison of Savings Banks' Predominant Mortgage Interest Rates 
	
with the Ceiling Rate' 	January 1970 to March 1988 
1481 	1983 	1485 	1487 
Source : Derived from Reserve Bank of Australia Monthly Bulletin and 
unpublished data 
a.The ceiling on mortgage interest rates is said to be binding when the 
savings banks' predominant mortgage interest rate and the ceiling are equal. 
In addition, when, in the regulated Australian financial market, 
other domestic rates were controlled, the extent to which rates such 
as the commercial bill rate have been 'market determined' may also 
be questionable. For example, if financial intermediaries received a 
regulated rate on their liabilities and simply needed to earn some 
'satisfactory margin' above this rate, there may be little incentive for 
the market to adjust fully. 
In an attempt to shed some light on the subject some simple 
but limited tests have been performed to try to establish the 
responsiveness of nominal interest rates to anticipated inflation in 
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Australia. While the institutional arrangements that have governed 
the Australian mortgage market suggest that the rate of anticipated 
inflation may not be of direct relevance to mortgage interest rates, 
"regression evidence provides a useful description of the joint 
evolution of mortgage and inflation rates." [Poterba, 1984, p.735] To 
this end Appendix C contains a report of some simple tests of the 
responsiveness to anticipated inflation of the nominal mortgage 
interest rate, the 90-day commercial bill rate and the 20-year bond 
rate. The results presented in Appendix C suggest that there are 
grounds for claiming that all three nominal rates in Australia are 
unresponsive to changes in inflationary expectations. 
Aside from the possibility of inappropriate modelling 
techniques, there are a number of plausible explanations for these 
findings. First, the manner in which the capital market was 
controlled in Australia prior to deregulation militated against the full 
incorporation of an inflation premium into nominal rates. Second, as 
Williams (1979) has found, there is some evidence to suggest that, for 
the period of the study, the Australian public may not have taken full 
account of inflationary expectations when making decisions about 
the allocation of its wealth. This would be contrary to rational 
expectations if such was the case in the long run. Third, the open 
nature of the Australian economy may imply that Australia is an 
interest rate taker in world capital markets. Finally, one may, like 
Harrod (1973), simply not accept the view propounded by Fisher. 
Harrod makes the point that: 
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... cash and bonds are both denominated in money. 
The rate of interest on bonds is the cost of going out of 
bonds into money, or, to put it the other way, it is the 
premium one receives if one goes out of money into 
bonds. It is, so to speak, the rate at which money 
exchanges for bonds. Since neither of these assets 
contains a hedge against inflation, it is not logical to 
affirm that the emergence of a sure prospect of 
inflation can alter the rate at which they exchange 
with each other. What is not logical cannot be 
accepted into the corpus of economic theory." [1973, 
p.71] 
— 	— 	 - - 	- --- 
Harrod conceded the prospect of the influence of a firm expectation of _ 	 — 
inflation only to the extent that it would alter the relative valuation 
of assets that provide no hedge against inflation, like bonds, and those 
that do, like equities and real estate. Although full exposition of 
Harrod's reasoning has not been given here, it remains that there are 
plausible reasons for not expecting nominal interest rates to fully 
reflect the rate of anticipated inflation. 6 
The evidence presented in this section and Appendix C, albeit 
limited, suggests that assuming: 
{L.dib/cln + (1 -L).di0/dn} < 1 and 	dib/dit < diddit 
is reasonable. Furthermore, di 0 /d7t is likely to be less than one since 
there are grounds for claiming that nominal interest rates in 
Australia do not rise point for point with inflation. Typically, L lies 
6 Harrod suggests a compromise himself: 
"The commonly held view is that it is the certainty, 
that inflation will proceed at a certain rate that is 
rate. I suggest, on the contrary, that it is uncertainty 
as regards inflation that can affect the interest rate." 
or strongly held belief, 
reflected into the interest 
about what may happen 
[1973, p.73] 
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in the range ( 0.8 < L< 1) and this implies, from Section 3.2.2, that 
dUC/cin <0 and Jower homeownership user costs will. ceteris paribus.  
lead to an increase in current housing demand. 
3.4 THE NET EFFECT OF INFLATIONARY CHANNELS 
It remains to establish whether the mortgage instrument (Channel 
One) or user cost (Channel Two) effects on the housing market are 
more significant. Through the first inflationary channel anticipated 
inflation is likely to reduce housing demand and, through the second, 
to increase housing demand. Unless the relative magnitude and 
impact of these two channels can be determined the net effect of 
anticipated inflation on the demand for housing cannot be 
established. 
There are three possible outcomes: Outcome (a), in which 
the mortgage characteristic effects dominate the user cost effect; 
Outcome (b), in which the user cost effect dominates the effects of 
the mortgage characteristics and; Outcome (c), in which the two 
channels act in equal and offsetting ways so as to leave the current 
demand for housing unchanged. In Sections 3.4.1 and 3.4.2 the 
comparative dynamics of the first two outcomes are examined. 
3.4.1 	Outcome (a): Channel One Dominates Channel Two 
Suppose there is an increase in the rate of anticipated inflation. If 
channel one dominates channel two then the net effect will be for 
this to reduce the demand for housing. The effects illustrated in 
Figure 3.2 would ensue. 
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FIGURE 3.2 
Outcome(a): Channel One Dominates Channel Two 
The (Ph • =0) locus would shift to the left to (Ph . =0) 1 because it is 
effectively the current demand curve for housing when there are no 
anticipated capital gains. The asset price of housing will immediately 
fall to the point X on the stable arm AB at the existing stock of 
housing H*. The economy moves along the stable arm to a new 
steady-state equilibrium at E'. On the path to E' asset prices increase 
and the housing stock decreases as gross housing investment, NH, 
declines in response to the price fall from Ph* to X. 
Agents in the housing market, with perfect foresight, know 
that prices will be increasing on the path to the new steady-state, 
since the fall in gross housing investment decreases the stock of 
housing units. Because agents actually expect to reap capital gains, 
the asset price does not fall to X' in response to the increase in 
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inflation. The decrease to X' is the change in the asset price that 
would ensue if agents expected the stock of housing units to remain 
fixed. That is, if agents failed to recognise that housing stock 
adjustments will accommodate the initial change in asset prices. 
The new steady-state, E', is characterised by a lower asset 
price, Ph*', and a smaller stock of housing units, H*'. 
3.4.2 	Outcome (b): Channel Two Dominates Channel One 
The second possible outcome is simply the counter example to Outcome 
(a). That is, if the reduction in user-cost increases housing demand to 
a greater extent than housing demand falls through the mortgage 
characteristics effect, then the (Pe=0) locus will move to the right to 
(Ph • =0)' as illustrated in Figure 3.3. 
FIGURE 3.3 
Outeome(b): Channel Two Dominates Channel one 
The asset price of housing will immediately rise to Y on the stable arm 
AB at the existing stock of housing H*. The economy will then move 
along AB to the new steady-state E'. On the path to E' asset prices 
decrease and the housing stock increasesT as gross housing 
59 
CHAPTER THREE : Dynamics 
investment, NH, increases in response to the price rise from Ph* to Y. 
Agents in the housing market, with perfect foresight, know that 
prices will be falling on the path to the new steady state since the 
increase in NH accompanying the initial increase in asset price to Y 
increases the stock of housing. Because the agents actually expect to 
make capital losses the price does not increase to Y' in response to the 
increase in anticipated inflation. The increase to Y' is the change in 
the asset price that would ensue if agents expected the stock of 
housing units to remain fixed. 
The new steady-state, E', is characterised by a higher asset 
price, Ph*', and a larger stock of housing units, H*'. 
Referring back to the analysis of Chapter 2, under rational 
expectations it has been hypothesised that, if the rental cost of home 
ownership exceeds the rental demand price (CASE 1, section 2.2.2), 
then the rate of change of the asset price of housing will be positive. 
This is represented as the null hypothesis Ho Similarly, if the rental 
demand price exceeds the rental cost (CASE 2, section 2.2.2), the rate of 
change of the asset price of housing will be negative. This is 
represented as the null hypothesis H o 2. 
Under Outcome (a), the fall in the rental demand price 
induced by an inflationary shock exceeds the accompanying fall in 
the user-cost of home ownership. Thus, Ph.UC'>R and Ph °>0. Thus, 
Outcome (a) is a restatement of H o 1. Similarly, under Outcome (b) the 
fall in the user-cost induced by an inflationary shock exceeds the 
accompanying fall in the rental demand price implying, in 
correspondence to Case 2, Ph.UC'<R and Ph .<0. Thus, Outcome (b) is a 
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restatement of Ho z 
These results are borne out in Figure 3.4 which illustrates the 
path of house prices as predicted by the two outcomes. 
Ph 
Ph 
Ph* 
X 
Ph* 
Ph* 
Ph 
0 	 time 
	
0 
	 time 
Outcome (a) 	 Outcome (b) 
FIGURE 3.4 
Path of Real House Prices as Predicted by Outcomes (a) and (b) 
Time t=0 represents the initial steady-state, E, and the time at which 
the inflationary shock is posited to occur. 
The task in estimating the empirical model, as developed in 
Chapter 4, will be to provide grounds for choosing one outcome over 
the other which is equivalent, in light of the above discussion, to 
testing Ho 1 against HA and H02 against HA 2. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: Empirical Model 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The objective in Chapter 4 is to obtain estimates of the parameters of 
the theoretical model presented in Chapters 2 and 3 using recent 
Australian data. This will assist in quantifying the relative 
magnitudes of the impact of inflation on the housing market through 
its two channels, as identified in Chapter 3. 
To that end, the model must be solved to yield a system of 
equations that may be estimated using Australian quarterly time 
series data. 
4.2 MODEL USED FOR ESTIMATION 
In the theoretical framework of Chapter 2, an inverse demand 
function for housing services was identified and represented in 
equation (2.3). Extending the analysis to include the demand for 
housing as an asset, it was suggested that, to ensure that equilibrium 
prevails in the asset market, the rental demand price, R, of a unit of 
housing will adjust to equal the rental cost of providing an additional 
unit of housing, Ph.UC. Thus: 
Ph = f ( R, UC ) 
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where 	 R = R ( H, y, hh, CA, M ) 	 (2.3) 
and 
	
UC = [Li b + (1-L)i 0 + x + d + m - ( ne + Ph. /Ph)] 
(2.4) 
Hence, the inverse demand function may be written as; 
Ph = f f  H, y, hh, CA, M, [Li b + (1-L)i0 + x + d + m - Ore + Ph. /Ph)] 
(4.1) 
where Ph is the real asset price of housing. Note that in Section 3.2.1 
two variables were identified; MP, the initial mortgage payment, and 
DN, the effective duration of the payment stream. These variables will 
be used to capture the mortgage characteristics term, M. 
On the supply side, the model was developed with the 
assumption that Ph would also regulate the rate of new housing 
production since Ph is the real price at which builders can sell new 
units of housing stock. The underlying assumption is that the 
housing construction industry is perfectly competitive so that 
industry supply depends simply on its output price. This leads to the 
specification of a construction supply function that models the rate of 
gross investment in new housing in each Australian State capital city 
as being determined by Ph, the real price of houses in that city.' 
The line of inquiry that Poterba (1984) explores, which 
1 	This is in direct contrast to Poterba's empirical work which centered on 
estimating the construction supply function rather than the inverse demand 
function. Poterba's supply function was thus relatively complex. Since the 
primary interest in this study lies in estimating the demand side parameters, 
a more complex demand side is specified along with a simplified supply side. 
Clearly, it would be favourable to have rich specifications of both demand and 
supply but time constraints prevent this. 
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acknowledges that construction decisions must themselves be based 
upon expectations of the prices that will prevail some months into the 
future, is not explored in the present study. A simplified modelling 
procedure is employed in that, although the demand side is assumed to 
require modelling that takes explicit account of its dynamic nature, 
the supply side can be modelled adequately as if it is static. That is, 
consumers respond to past and present information, whereas 
producers utilise only current information. This is not considered to 
be a major problem because quarterly data is used and the time 
involved in building a house rarely exceeds three months. 
In preliminary experiments the impact of two other 
variables on the flow of new construction was examined. These 
variables were; the real price of alternative construction projects; 
and construction costs (including the relative price of inputs and the 
prevailing real award wage in the construction sector). However a 
simultaneity problem emerges in such specifications, since it is likely 
that the movement in construction costs would be demand 
determined. That is, increased demand for housing units would be 
likely to bring with it increased demand for inputs and upward 
pressure on input prices. This implies that increased input prices 
may not be accompanied by a diminished flow of new construction, 
since the rate of new construction is influenced by output prices 
which are responsive to increased demand. A further difficulty was 
that data on a suitable proxy for the real price of alternative 
construction projects (for example a non-residential construction 
deflator from the national accounts) was not available across 
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individual states. Other attempts to devise such a proxy proved 
inadequate. This was not a cause for great concern since the extent to 
which factors are substitutable between alternative projects of this 
type is unclear. The simple specification of construction supply was 
thus; 
Gross investment = NH = g ( Ph, D 1 , D2 , D3) ( 4 . 2 ) 
where D I , D2 and D 3 are seasonal dummy variables. From first-stage 
estimation of equation (4.2), the differential equation in the stock of 
housing (equation 2.6) may be utilised to generate a series on the 
estimated housing stock, HA  t.This series is, in turn, included as an 
explanatory variable in the inverse demand function given in (4.1). 
HA t = Ht_ i + NHAt - dH t _ i 	 (4.3) 
Since the housing stock is to be measured in terms of the 
number of dwelling units and not as the value of the stock, the 
depreciation of the stock should equal the number of residential 
demolitions in each quarter. It is assumed that these constitute a 
negligable proportion of the stock so it is defensible to set the 
parameter d equal to zero. 2 
To facilitate consistent parameter estimation, the model is 
2 It is consistent to retain a measure of depreciation on the demand side of 
the model, whilst at the same time assuming the absence of depreciation on 
the supply side, since the former represents a proportion of the value of the 
stock of housing units owned by the household. 
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specified as follows (note that the signs attached to the parameters 
are those hypothesised in Chapter 2). Utilising a linear functional 
form for (4.1) and (4.2) the following model is obtained: 
Ph t = - a i HA t + a2y t + a 3hh t + a 4CAt - a5MP t - a 6DNt 
- a7UC't + aeche t 
HA t = Ht _ i + NHAt 
= Ht-i + DiPht 13 2D it + 13 3D 2t + 134D 3t 
where ithe t is the expected rate of real house price inflation defined 
as: 	 (tPhet+1 Pht)/ Pht 
- - 	 _ 
and is analagous to Ph'/Ph, andi UC' t = + m 
is that part of the real user-cost measure that may be considered to be 
exogenous. Equation (4.4) is a discrete time version of the inverse 
demand function in (4.1). Substituting (4.5) into (4.4) yields: 
Pht 	 PlPht + - 2D it+ 13 3D2t + 134D3t) + a2yt + a 3h h t 
a4CAt a5MP t a 6DNt a71JC' + aohe t 
• = 	a I P iph t - oc 1 13 2D it + a l i.5 3D2t + a i l34D 3t + ag t 
+ a3hh t + a 4CAt - a5MP t - a6D•N t - a7UC't + aohe t 
Ph t (1+ a 1 3 1) = zt + aohe t 
Ph t = j/(1+ a 1 13 1) z + a 8/(1+ a 1 0 1)7che t 	 (4.6) 
where ; is a (10x1) matrix in which all the k exogenous variables; 
H t _ ? D i? D2? D3 , yt , hht, CAt , MPt, DNt and UC't , have been stacked and 
j is a (1x10) row vector of coefficients on the exogenous variables 
contained in Z. 
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That is, 
  
= • )[a a 1 02 a133 '11134 a2 a 3 a 4 as a 6 a7 
 
  
Zt = 
( 10x 1) 
The notation tPh e t + 1 is used to denote the expectation, formed in 
period t, of Ph t + 1. Agents have been assumed to form these 
expectations rationally in the sense that all information available, up 
to and including the present, is used in forming expectations about 
future economic events. [see section 1.5]. The expectation is 
conditional on the information set, CI t , which in the present case 
contains information analagous to the structure of the economy (that 
is, the model) and knowledge of past values of the exogenous and 
endogenous variables therein. S-2 t is assumed to be available and 
utilised by agents in forming expectations regarding Ph t+ I That is: 
tPh e t+ 1 = E [ '+i! 	Pht+1" 
where T is a random vector that is uncorrelated with the information 
set S2 t. Under 	the assumption of perfect foresight (there is no 
Ht- 1 
D1 t 
D2 t 
D3 1 
Y t 
h h t 
CA t 
MPt 
DN t 
UC't 
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uncertainty) 	tPhe t+1=Ph t+1. Substituting for Inle t , equation (4.5) may 
be approximated as: 
ht = j/(1+ a 1 13 1) Z + a 811(1+ a i lyAlogPh t+i 	(4.7) 
because: 
AlogPh t+i= log(Pht+i) — log(Ph) 
= log( Pht+i/ Ph t ) 
log [(Ph i + Pht+1  — Ph)/Phi} 
= log [ 1 + (Pht+ r Pht)/Ph i ] 
(Pht+i— Ph t)/Ph t 
for values of (Pht+ r-Ph t)/Ph i that are small. This is a convenient 
transformation which allows the model to be represented as a linear 
semilog function. From equation (4.7), and the assumption that 
expectations are formed rationally, it is clear that Ph t depends on the 
expectation of Phtn. This expectation may be found by recognising 
that it is based on the known structure of the model. 
4.3 CONSISTENT ESTIMATION USING INSTRUMENTAL 
VARIABLES 
In the present rational expectations model, the explanatory variable, 
Ph t+ 1, reflects values of the dependent (endogenous) variable that are 
expected to prevail in the future. Since this implies that one of the 
explanatory variables is contemporaneously correlated with the 
disturbance, it poses the statistical problem that: 3 
plim((l/n )(X'u)) # 0 
3 See Johnston (1972), pp. 271-281. 
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where 	
• 	
is the sample size; 
X 	is the (nxk) matrix of explanatory variables; and 
• is the (nxl) column vector of disturbance terms. 
Since, 	plim ((lin )(X ' u )) = 0, is a necessary condition for the 
consistency of the least-squares estimator, application of the 
Ordinary Least Squares estimator to the present model is 
inappropriate. Consistency is an important property of an estimator 
because it guarantees that the estimates it yields will improve as 
sample size increases. That is, the sampling distribution of the 
estimator will tend to become concentrated on the true value of the 
parameter as sample size increases. An alternative method of 
estimation, which is known to give consistent estimates in this case, is 
the method of instrumental variables. 
McCallum (1976) suggests an instrumental variables 
technique to provide consistent estimates of parameters in models 
that incorporate rational expectations. In the context of the present 
problem, this amounts to eliminating the unobservable variable, 
Ph i .", using an instrumental variable. A brief outline of the theory 
underlying the use of this technique follows. 
Assume that the exogenous variables of the model are 
generated by a vector autoregressive stochastic process that does not 
depend on the process determining the endogenous variable Ph i . For 
example: 
Zt = 01 Zt-1 + 02 Zt-2 	 + Op Zt-p et 
is a vector autoregressive process of order p where e t has a mean of 
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zero and is serially uncorrelated. 	Consistent with the concept of 
rationality, the current period expectation of next period's price has 
been defined as: 
tPhe t + 	E [ Pht+11 C2 t] = Pht+i 
and 	t is generated by, at least, the present and past values of the 
variables included in the model. That is: 
C2t= [Z1 Zt-1 Zt-2  Zt-n ; Pht Phi 	Pht-2   Pht-n ; 
Now, if the conditional expectation of Pht+1 is linear, then it may be 
written as a linear function of the variables contained in Q t . 
E [Ph+  Q t] = 50Zt + 	 + Sn Z t_n + yeht + yiPh t y2P h t _ 2 
+ YnPht-n 
Pht+1" 
Hence, Pht+i may be written: 
Ph t+1 = 	t 5 iZt-1+ 	 + 8n Zt_n + yeht + yiP h t _ y2P h t _ 2 50Z  
	 + YnPht-n 
The model given by equation (4.7) may, therefore, be estimated using 
the instrumental variable technique with the instrument for 
AlogPht÷i being the estimated vector of 6, log A Ph 1  which is t + 
generated from the regression of illogPh t+i on a vector of 
instruments selected from the information set a t . 
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The method of instrumental variables involves a search for a 
new variable A 1 o g A Ph t +1 that is both highly correlated with 
A logPh t+ and is, at the same time, uncorrelated with the error term 
in the equation of the model to be estimated. The exogenous variables 
in the model will serve as instruments because their appearance in 
the model suggests that they are correlated with Ph t and they are 
exogenous (or predetermined) and are therefore uncorrelated with 
the error term. Given the assumptions, the necessary conditions for 
the application of McCallum's instrumental variables technique will 
be satisfied. Estimation of the model given by equation (4.7), using the 
instrumental variable A 1 og A Ph t+ I will therefore yield consistent 
parameter estimates. 
4.4 DATA AND PARAMETER ESTIMATION 
The model given in equation (4.7) was estimated, using quarterly data 
for the years 1980:1 to 1988:4 inclusive, across the six Australian State 
capital cities as well as for Australia in aggregate. Although much of 
the data was available monthly, some was available only quarterly. 
Some of the data requirements could not be met for Canberra or 
Darwin so these cities were omitted from analysis. 
There is no freely published data relating to Australian house 
prices. The real price of housing in each State capital city was 
represented by the median price for established houses in that city, 
as estimated by the Real Estate Institute of Australia (REIA), divided by 
the Consumer Price Index, excluding the housing expenditure class, 
for each city in each quarter (ABS unpublished data). Although the 
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REIA does not estimate median house prices for Australia in 
aggregate, a measure was derived in the current study by weighting 
the capital city prices using population data from the ABS. 
The data that was made available by the REIA was not ideal in 
that it represented median house prices in each city and it was not 
possible to ascertain the distribution of house prices on either side of 
the median value. Indeed, the fact that the data utilised was available 
for only the capital city in each State, means that other data used in 
the analysis, that was available only on a State-wide basis, was not 
strictly comparable. Unfortunately, this limitation could not be 
overcome in the short run. 
     
in each city, . each quarter, was 
- 
The stock of owner-occupied housing units _ 
      
determined using the first-stage predicted number of new dwelling 
commencements in the State during the quarter. These predictions 
were used to augment and deplete the known number of occupied 
private dwellings in each State obtained from the census of 30th June, 
1986. The results of the first-stage estimation are given in Table 4.1. 
Since the equations displayed first-order autocorrelation, they were 
estimated using the Cochrane-Orcutt procedure. In each case the 
dependent variable is the number of new private sector residential 
dwelling commencements in each State obtained from ABS building-
activity data. Encouragingly, when comparing the predicted housing 
stock for the June quarter of 1981 with the reported stock from the 
census of that year the error was less than 3 percent in every case. 
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Table 4.1 
First-Stage Estimated Coefficients 
Sydney 	Melbourne Brisbane 
Ph 	i3 i = 5.322 	13.553 	12.673 
	
(3.344) (4.425) (7.036) 
[1.591] 	[3.063] 	[1.801] 
D I 	02= 0.099 0.428 0.675 
(0.345) 	(0.225) 	(0.231) 
[0.286] [1.905] [2.926] 
D2 	i3 3 = 1.247 	 0.714 	0.951 
(0.389) (0.253) 	(0.268) 
[3.207] 	[2.824] [3.555] 
D3 	13 4 = 0.585 0.718 	0.940 
(0.350) 	(0.225) (0.237) 
[1.668] [3.197] 	[3.959] 
Constant Po= 5.866 	0.475 2.416 
(2.705) (2.290) 	(3.253) 
[2.169] 	[0.207] [0.743] 
R 2 0.782 	0.798 	0.795 R2 	0.757 0.774 0.772 
Rho 0.010 	-0.187 	0.311 
DW 	 1.956 2.371 1.336 
Adelaide 	Perth 	Hobart* 
Ph 	P i = 3.679 	3.920 	0.552 
(2.049) (2.867) (0.554) 
[1.795] 	[1.367] 	[0.996] 
DI 	13 2= 0.233 0.296 0.038 
(0.087) 	(0.132) 	(0.030) 
[2.679] [2.244] [1.270] 
D2 	133= 0.219 	 0.536 	0.053 
(0.101) (0.153) (0.035) 
[2.167] 	[3.495] 	[1.506] 
D3 	34= 0.291 0.245 -0.033 
(0.089) 	(0.137) 	(0.032) 
[3.278] [1.794] (-1.006] 
Constant 130 = 0.551 	 2.582 	0.680 
(0.930) (1.408) (0.225) 
[0.593] 	[1.834] 	[3.022] 
R 2 	 0.801 	0.759 	0.559 
k2 0.778 0.731 0.708 
Rho 	-0.209  0.029 	-0.073 
DW 2.335 	1.912 2.145 
only 19 observations available 
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Table 4.1 continued... 
AUSTRALIA 
Ph 	13 =44.309 
(13.244) 
[3.346] 
D I 	02= 1.558 
(0.674) 
[2.311] 
D2 	133= 3.684 
(0.766) 
[4.809] 
134= 2.730 
(0.686) 
[3.982] 
Constant 13 0 = 6.640 
(7.653) 
[0.868] 
R2 	 0.825 
112 0.805 
Rho 	0.117 
DW 1.763 
Note: Dependent variable in each case is NH = the 
number of new private sector residential 	dwelling 
commencements; standard errors appear 	in 
parentheses and t statistics appear in square brackets. 
_ 
/ The desired income measure was real median disposable permanent 
I household income, by State capital city. 
_ 
This was represented by the 
quarterly equivalent of estimated median weekly family income 
figures provided by the REIA. Clearly, there are limitations in using 
this income measure, not the least of which is that it takes no account 
of the effects of taxation over the sample period. It was used, however, 
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because a better income measure could not be found in the time 
available for the project. 
The variable hh was used - to capture demographic 
characteristics since, as Jaffee and Rosen (1979) and Hendershott 
(1980) have emphasised, households with different demographic 
characteristics have sharply different homeownership rates. For 
example, results of the Survey of Housing Occupancy Costs (ABS, 1980) 
indicated that only 4.1 percent of households with head under 25 
years of age were in the process of purchasing their own home, 
compared with 14.3 percent of those with head between 25 and 29 
years, 20.1 percent of those with head between 30 and 34 years and 
_ I a 61.5 percent rate amongst older household heads. Hendershott also suggested _ 
that this variable may capture, in part, the declining impact of 
financial constraints on older families who have experienced equity 
gains. In the absence of time series data on the proportion of 
households with head aged 25 to 34, the proportion of the total 
population aged 25 to 34 in each State was included as an explanatory 
variable in the inverse demand function. Unfortunately, this 
information was only available by State on an annual basis (ABS 
unpublished data), and it was necessary to interpolate between the 
annual observations, by fitting a log-linear function to the available 
data points, to approximate a quarterly series. 
CA, credit availability, 	is seen by many as an important 
determinant of the demand for owner-occupied housing, given the 
importance of mortgage finance to realising a planned house 
purchase. 4 This suggests that poor credit availability could reduce 
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• housing demand. Two credit availability measures were incorporated 
into this study. The first, CAI, represents the change in Savings Bank 
and Permanent Building Society deposits, by State, divided by the 
average value of a new housing loan across those lenders in that 
State. 5 This measure is similar to that used by Manchester and is 
intended to represent the number of "average" loans that could be 
made available in the quarter given the increase in funds (liabilities) 
available to be offset by new assets. The second measure of credit 
availability, CA 2, was reported by Hendershott as the average change 
in deposits in the previous two quarters divided by the price of a 
constant-quality house. Since data on the latter was unavailable, the 
average value of a- housing loan in the current period in each State 
was used in the denominator instead. This second measure of credit 
availability is close to that used by Jaffee and Rosen (1979). 
- - 	- - - 
IMP was measured as the initial real quarterly mortgage payment 
on a SFPM on an average loan (as used in calculating CA) for the 
State, given the State's current quarter's predominant nominal 
mortgage interest rate and based on a loan with an amortisation 
period, T, of 20 years:5 Since credit availability from both Savings 
4 There is, however, much controversy 	regarding this issue. While Jaffee 
and Rosen (1979) have reported results of a very large impact of 	credit 
availability on the demand for housing, De Rosa and 	Meltzer (1978) could find 
no impact. 
5 As Permanent Building Societies and Savings Banks dominate the lending 
for housing, the calculations can be based solely on these lending sources. 
The increase in Permanent Building Societies' deposits was represented by 
the change in their borrowings from the private sector i.e. withdrawable 
share capital and unsecured borrowings (Source: ABS Cat.No. 5617.0 and 
5637.0). 
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Banks and Permanent Building Societies (PBS) was to be incorporated, 
it was necessary to approximate an average nominal mortgage 
interest rate by quarter by using Savings Banks' mortgage interest 
rates, as reported in the Reserve Bank of Australia's monthly 
Bulletins, and State-specific PBS nominal mortgage rates. A weighted 
average rate was then calculated using the proportion of the total 
housing loans in the quarter made by each type of lender as weights. 
An alternative measure for MP was the quarter equivalent of the 
average monthly loan repayment provided by the REIA. This variable 
is denoted AQLR in the tables presented below. 
Measurment of the nominal mortgage interest rate is a 
significant limitation to the quantitative analysis. Australian 
financial markets have been deregulated only recently. The nominal 
mortgage interest rate charged by Savings Banks on new housing 
loans was subject to a 13.5 percent ceiling for the larger part of the 
sample period and it is thus only the most recent 11 observations 
(from 1986:2, when the ceiling was lifted, to 1988:4) that would truly 
[-capture the effects outlined in chapters 1-3. However, if the study was , 
restricted to this small number of observations, the sample period 
would be clearly inadequate. 
A further reason for concern about the use of Savings Banks 
mortgage rates in the analysis is the fact that, under regulation, the 
existence of the "cocktail loan" commonly made the effective cost of 
6 Male (1988) has argued that at times when the availability of credit is 
poor, particularly in periods when the ceiling on 	mortgage interest rates has 
been binding, potential mortgagees have been rationed out of 	the mortgage 
market through non-price means. 
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housing finance from Savings Banks higher than the regulated rate 
implied. The term "cocktail loan" was used in the early 1980's to 
describe the loan package provided by banks who, unable to compete 
for deposits, had very little money to lend. They financed a small 
proportion of a housing loan at the artificially low rate of 13.5 per 
cent and the remainder with a personal loan, at a much higher rate 
of interest. 7 The result of this was that the average cost of housing 
finance was quite close to the then market rate of interest. 
The suggestion that the nominal mortgage interest rate, 
which has been measured in this study as a weighted average of the 
rates charged by Savings Banks and Permanent Building Societies 
over the sample period, may be understated has implications for the 
variables that have been derived on the basis of this rate, when . 
interpreted with reference to the arguments of the the previous • 
chapters, would be biased. For example, in the 'tilt effect', intended to . 
be captured by the variables MP and DN, the flexibility of nominal 
interest rates is implicitly assumed. 8 
_ 
7 This part of the loan package, upon which a much higher rate of 	interest 
was charged, was commonly financed 	by the bank's finance company 
affiliate. 
8 This limitation is not as crucial to the results for the variable UC' since, 
in the discussion of Sections 3.2.2 and 3.3, the small positive responsiveness of 
Australian nominal interest rates in an inflationary environment, ceteris 
paribus, was canvassed. Indeed, the suggestion there that; ( Ldibldn + (1L) 
dio ldn) < 1 led to the hypothesis that inflation would enhance housing 
demand by delivering more in terms of capital gains through nominal house 
price inflation than it did to an increase in the exogenous user-cost 
component. This, in turn, implied the expected coefficient signs; a7 < 0 and 
a8 > 0. 
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DN was calculated for an amortisation period of 20 years, as 
used in MP, but using the annual payment on •a SFPM for an average 
loan value for the State. 
Finally, a time series on 	UC', homeowner's exogenous real 
user costs, was constructed. To proxy the unobservable expected rate 
of general price inflation, an ARIMA(0,1,1) model was fitted to a data 
series on actual quarterly price inflation for each State capital city to 
generate one-period-ahead forecasts of the inflation rate for each 
city [as in Appendix C]. d , the rate of depreciation of the house, has 
been, in most studies, assumed to accrue at some fixed proportion of 
the purchase price of the house and that tradition is retained here. To 
represent x , the rate of property tax liabilities incurred, and m, 
miscellaneous expenses including maintainance and repairs, use was 
made of the expenditure classes; "Local government rates and 
charges" and "House repairs and maintainance" and "House 
insurance" of the Housing sub-group of the Consumer Price Index, 
respectively (ABS unpublished data). The percentage rate of change 
of these indices was calculated for each State and used to adjust an 
assumed annual 2.0 percent rate of depreciation and 2.5 percent 
maintainance costs. 9 The initial loan-to-value ratio was again 
taken as 0.80, with i b the weighted average nominal mortgage 
interest rate across savings banks and permanent building societies 
in the State. io , the opportunity cost of housing equity, was proxied 
9 Prior to March quarter, 1987, the sub-classes "House repairs and 
maintainance" and "House insurance" were published as a composite series 
"Other home ownership". 
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as the long-term bond rate. The constructed series on UC' for each 
State Capital city are plotted in the Figure 4.1. 
FIGURE 4.1 
Real Exogenous User-Cost (% of asset price): 
by State Capital Citya 
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FIGURE 4.1 continued ... 
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FIGURE 4.1 continued ... 
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Table 4.2 shows the results of the instrumental variables estimation of 
the model given in (4.7). The columns headed (1) and (2) indicate the 
different specifications using the two alternative measures of credit 
availability and of the initial mortgage payment. _ 
Table 4.2 
Results of Instrumental Variables Estimation of Equation(4.7) 
Variable 	 Sydney 	 Melbourne 
(1) 	 (2) 	 (1) 	 (2) 
H 	 -0.033 	-0.013 	0.046 	0.030 
(0.024) (0.025) (0.031) (0.026) 
(-1.386] 	(-0.505] 	[1.494] 	[1.168] 
Y 	 13.196* 	2.243 	6.040 	7.314 
(6.122) (6.519) (7.077) (5.707) 
[2.156] 	[0.344] 	[0.854] 	[1.282] 
hh 	 76561* 	79090* 	12749 	8369.8 
(9811.2) (8493.6) (9578.4) (7815.2) 
[7.803] 	[9.312] 	[1.331] 	[1.071] 
CA1 	 -0.039 	 - 	 0.002 
(0.059) (0.059) 
(-0.656] 	 [0.041] 
CA2 	 _ 	 -0.417* 	_ 	 -0.328* 
(0.154) (0.127) 
[-2.716] 	 [-2.575] 
MP 	 6.140 	 5.788 
(5.823) (5.257) 
[1.054] 	 [1.101] 
AQLR 	 - 	 -0.123 	 - 	 8.040* 
(4.663) (4.140) 
(-0.026] 	 [1.942] 
DN 	 6655* 	8004* 	13133* 	13256* 
(2800) (2350) (2681.5) (2118.6) 
[2.377] 	[3.406] 	[4.898] 	[6.257] 
UC 	 -250.440 	1152.600 	2910.300 	3375.400* 
(1133.4) (1172.3) (1974.5) (1593.4) 
[-0.221] 	[0.983] 	[1.474] 	[2.118] 
AlogPlit4.1 	151.980 	151.040* 	-311.540 	-238.010* 
(117.72) 	(86.732) (186.84) 	(13635) 
[1.291] [1.741] 	[-1.667] (-1.743] 
corm= 	-0.122x107* 	-0.125x107* 	-0.343x106* 	-0.261x106* 
(0.191x106) 	(0.172x106) 	(0.173x106) 	(0.140x106) 
[-6.377] (-7.268] [-1.983] 	[-1.863] 
R2 	 0.883 	0.906 	0.878 	0.920 
0.844 0.874 0.842 0.896 
DW 	 1.927 2.016 	
2.144  -085 	
2.045 
0 Rho 0.015 	-0.021 -0.036 
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Table 4.2 continued 
Variable 	 Brisbane 	 Adelaide 
-0.035 
(0.073) 
[-0.483] 
15.685 
(9.878) 
[1.588] 
hh 
	
40195* 
(20297) 
[1.980] 
CA1 	 -0.043 
(0.158) 
[-0.274] 
0.007 
(0.082) 
[0.087] 
15.981* 
(8.925) 
[1.791] 
33248 
(20806) 
[1.598] 
0.517* 
(0.270) 
[1.914] 
-0.0004 
(0.0002) 
[-0.779] 
-36903* 
(8226.6) 
[-4.486] 
-0.315* 
(0.188) 
[-1.675]  
(2) 
0.378 
(0.474) 
[0.798] 
-0.0003 
(0.0003) 
[-0.751] 
-39747* 
(10309) 
[-3.855] 
(1) 	 (2) 	 (1) 
CA2 	 -0.345 	 -0.881 
MP 
(0.379) 
[-0.913] 
2.182 
(17.601) 
[0.124] 
(0.533) 
[4.653] 
9.618* 
(3.954) 
[2.433] 
AQLR 
DN 
	
3331 
(5416) 
[0.615] 
UC' 	 975.450 
(1719.2) 
[0.567] 
AlogPht+i 	-571.890 
(389.18) 
[4.470] 
constant 	-O. 663 x106* 
(0.317x106) 
[-2.093] 
R2 
	
0.251 
0.011 
DW 
	
1.967 
Rho 0.007 
-5.780 
(17.554) 
[-0.329] 
2202 
(6025) 
[0.366] 
495.870 
(1566.7) 
[0.317] 
-437.880 
(370.2) 
[4.183] 
-0.568x 106* 
(0.329x106) 
[-1.726] 
0.399 
0.206 
1.833 
0.078 
8894* 
(2364) 
[3.762] 
5539.100* 
(1749.7) 
[3.166] 
-267.180 
(266.73) 
[-1.002] 
0.353x 106* 
(0.161x106) 
[2.199] 
0.837 
0.786 
1.902 
0.029 
11.156 
(10.990) 
[1.015] 
11516* 
(3541) 
[3.252] 
4077A00* 
(2112.8) 
[1.930] 
-481.220 
(408.61) 
[-1.178] 
0.434x106* 
(0.251x106) 
[4.728]  
0.754 
0.675 
1.994 
-0.017 
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Table 4.2 continued ... 
Variable Perth Hobart 
(1) (2) (1) (2) 
0.129* 0.136* 1.402* 1.089 
(0.060) (0.052) (0.622) (0.848) 
(-2.146] [-2.582] [2.256] [1.283] 
-1.204 1.273 15.158 31.592 
(1.988) (2.177) (23.494) (30.634) 
[-0.606] [0.585] [0.645] [1.031] 
hh 1153.200 3191.600 7231.100 30492 
(3633.8) (3152.6) (24506) (35845) 
[0.317] [1.012] [0.295] [0.851] 
CAi 0.027 -0.029 
(0.085) (0.050) 
[0.321] [-0387] 
CA2 -0.212* 0.010 
(0.113) (0.277) 
[-1.879] [0.034] 
MP 12.726* -26.813* 
(7.291) (11.003) 
[1.745] [-2.437] 
AQLR 12.167* -10.458 
(5.626) (16511) 
[2.162] [-0.633] 
DN -663.510 -60.182 -13784* 6806 
(1723.3) (1446.6) (5463.8) (11639) 
[-0.385] [-0.042] [-2323] [-0.585] 
UC -1173.000* -1116.400* -90.336 -77.260 
(638.230) (608.690) (845.89) (10745) 
[-1.838] [-1.834] [-0.107] [-0.072] 
AlogPht+1 31.865 30.324 214.740 123.64 
(72.146) (67527) (130.340) (292.370) 
[0.442] [0.449] [1.648] [0.423] 
COIIStallt 71958 26755 -0.216x106 • -0.667x 106 
(84634) (71863) (0358x106) (0.816x106) 
[0.850] [0.372] [-0.386] [-0.818] 
R2 
rt2 
0.757 0.788 0.844 0.687 
0.679 0.721 0.706 0.409 
DW 2.066 1.948 2.700 2.025 
Rho -0.074 -0.059 -0.037 -0.028 
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Table 4.2 continued ... 
Variable 	 AUSTRALIA 
(1) 	 (2) 
-0.031 -0.039 
(0.024) 
	(0.027) 
[-1.260] [-1.444] 
35.429 
	
30.762 
(22.476) (20.557) 
[1.576] 
	[1.496] 
hh 
	
110050 
	
104950* 
(64456) (54689) 
[1.707] 
	[1.919] 
CA1 	 -0.001 
(0.005) 
[-0.316] 
CA2 	 -0.002 
(0.012) 
[-0.191] 
MP 
AQLR 
DN 
UC' 
AlogPht+1 
constant 
19.914 
(18.949) 
[1.051] 
21.785 
(15.334) 
[1.421] 
6688 	 8375 
(8961) (8270) 
[0.746] 	[1.013] 
-539.680 	104.580 
(2165.1) (2105.8) 
[-0.249] 	[0.050] 
-666.860 	-602.580 
(650.790) (574.160) 
[-1.023] 	[-1.050] 
-0.180x107 	-0.168x107* 
(0.105x107) 	(0.888x106) 
[4.717] [-1.890] 
R2 
	
0.673 
	
0.715 
	
0.485 0.552 
DW 
	
2.370 
	
2.226 
Rho -0.227 -0.164 
Note: Dependent variable in each case is rph = the real median price of 
houses; standard errors appear in parentheses and t statistics appear in 
square brackets; * indicates significance at 0.05; the units of measurement of 
the variables give rise to their extreme relative magnitudes. 
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In light of the limitation in measuring the nominal mortgage interest 
rate, an attempt was made to test the hypothesis that a lack of 
variability in the mortgage interest rate (because Savings Banks 
were subject to a 13.5 percent ceiling until April 1986) influenced the 
signs and relative magnitudes of the estimated coefficients, 
particularly with respect to the variables MP, DN and UC'. 
The model was re-estimated using only the nominal mortgage 
interest rate charged by Permanent Building Societies in each State to 
calculate the data series on DN, MP and UC'. This may be justified on 
the basis that the nominal mortgage interest rate charged by 
Permanent Building Societies in each State is likely to be a suitable 
proxy for the nominal mortgage interest rate that would be charged 
by Savings Banks if they too had been unregulated. The results of this 
re-estimation are presented in Appendix D where the figures in bold 
type in the columns headed (1)b and (2)b are those for which only 
the Building Society interest rate was used. There was very little 
change in the signs or relative significance of the parameter 
estimates. It appears, therefore, that neither the inconsistency of the 
results across specifications (as discussed in Chapter 5), nor the 
unexpected coefficient signs can be attributed to this limitation. 
Using the first-stage parameter estimates presented in Table 
4.2 the estimated coefficients and associated elasticities of the inverse 
demand function may now be identified. 1 
1 0 Note that the parameter estimates reported in Table 4.1 are based on units 
of measurment of the dependent variable rph in $'000. Hence, in the 
calculations to• identify the individual coefficients of the inverse demand 
function, presented in Table 4.3, it was necessary to rescale the 13's to measure 
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4.5 ESTIMATED COEFFICIENTS AND ELASTICITIES 
In Table 4.3, the individual coefficients of the inverse demand 
function are presented. These have been identified using the second-
stage parameter estimates presented in Table 4.2. For example, the 
derivation of the model used for estimation [Section 4.2] , implies that 
the direct estimation results of the variable coefficients constitute 
elements of the product j/(14-a 1 13 1) necessitating identification of the 
elements of vector j for each specification [see equation (4.7)]. 	The 
first-stage results, 	obtained by estimating the supply-side of the 
model (presented in Table 4.1), 	facilitate the full identification of the 
demand-side coefficients. 
Table 4.3 
Estimated Coefficients of the Inverse Demand Function 
Parameter 
Estimate (1) 
Sydney 
(2) 
Melbourne 
(1) 	 (2) 
a 1 = -0.033 -0.013 0.486 0.315 
a2 = 13.173* 2.241 6.438 7.626 
a3 = 76426* 79035* 12136 8727 
a4 = -0.039 -0.417* 0.002 -0.342* 
a6 = 6.129 -0.123 6.169 8.383* 
a6 = 6643* 7998* 13998* 13821* 
a7 = -250.886 1151.839 3102.407 3519.658* 
a8 = 151.713 150.936* -332.062 -248.171* 
constant = -0.122x107* -0.125x107* -0.341x106* -0.260x106* 
* indicates significance at 0.05. 
the real asset price of housing (dependent variable, rph) in dollars. 
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Table 4.3 continued - 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Brisbane 
(1) 	 (2) 
Adelaide 
(1) 	 (2) 
al = -0.035 0.037 0.527* 0.383 
c42 = 15.616 15.995* -0.0004 -0.0003 
a3 = 40017* 33277 -37618* -40307* 
a4 = -0.043 -0.345 -0.321* -0.893 
al 2.172 -5.785 9.804* 11.313 
a6 = 3316 2204 9066* 11678* 
a7 = 971.146 496.309 5646* 4135* 
al = -569.365 -438.268 -272.361 -488.006 
constant= -0.660x106' -0.568x106' 0.360x106' 0.440x106' 
Parameter 
Estimate (1) 
Perth 
(2) 
Hobart 
(1) 	 (2) 
a l -0.128* -0.135* 1.413* 1.096 
a2 -1.198 1.266 15.276 31.783 
a3 1147 3175 7288 30676 
a4 0.027 -0.211* -0.029 0.010 
as 12.662* 12.102* -27.022* -10.521 
a6 	= -660.172 -59.863 -13891* -6847 
a7 -1167* -1110* -91.040 -76.727 
al 31.704 30.163 216.414 124.388 
constant = 72293 26613 -0.217x 106 -0.671x 106 
Parameter 
Estimate 
AUSTRALIA 
(1) 	 (2) 
a l = -0.031 -0.038 
422 = 34.949 30.239 
a3 = 108559 103167* 
a4 = -0.001 -0.002 
a5 = 19.644 21.415 
a6 = 6597 8233 
al = -532.367 102.804 
a8 = -657.824 -592.344 
constant = -0.177x107 -0.165x1070 
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In Table 4.4 the estimated elasticities of real house prices with respect 
to each of the independent variables in the model are presented. 
These elasticities have been calculated at the variable sample means 
and, given the lack of a marked variation of the results between the 
two specifications, are given for specification (1) only. 
Similarly, in Table 4.5 the price elasticities of supply are 
presented. These represent the responsiveness of new housing 
production to a proportionate change in the real price of units of 
housing stock. 
Table 4.4 
Demand-Side Elasticities Evaluated at Meansa 
Variable Sydney Melbourne Brisbane Adelaide Perth Hobart AUSTRALIA 
H -0.83 1.17 -0.67 5.27 -1.45 5.24 -2.82 
r 0.77 0.49 1.43 -0.67 -0.13 1.36 2.57 
hh 17.75 4.08 15.56 4339 0.52 2.89 32.50 
CA -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 
MP 0.13 0.15 0.06 0.28 0.39 -0.85 0.55 
DN 0.64 1.74 0.54 1.34 -0.12 -2.27 0.80 
UC -0.01 0.13 0.05 0.28 -0.07 -0.01 -0.03 
AlogPl1t4.1 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.02 
a Elasticities printed in bold type are those associated with statistically 
significant coefficient estimates (two-tailed test at the 5% level of significance). 
Table 4.5 
Supply-Side Elasticities Evaluated at Means a 
City 	 Price Elasticity of Supply 
Sydney 	 0.38 
Melbourne 0.88 
Brisbane 	 0.69 
Adelaide 0.68 
Perth 	 0.38 
Hobart 0.24 
AUSTRALIA 	 0.75 
a Each of these elasticites is associated - with a statistically 
significant coefficient estimate as reported in Table 4.1. 
These results are discussed in Chapter 5. 
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5.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter the individual coefficient estimates of the inverse 
demand function and the estimated elasticities are discussed, and 
possible reasons for the inconsistencies in the results are 
addressed. 
Anticipating the results presented below, there appears to 
be little consistency in the estimates across the different cities. A 
notable feature is the variation in the performance of the variables 
that are of particular interest in the present study; MP, DN and UC. 
The results neither corroborate the hypotheses postulated nor do 
they provide conclusive evidence in support or refutation of the 
economic priors outlined in the preceeding chapters. 
5.2 ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
Some care should be taken in interpreting the individual 
coefficient estimates, particularly since the units of measurement 
of the variables imply a wide range of coefficient magnitudes 
which are poor indicators of relative impacts. A more fruitful line 
of inquiry is to examine the implied elasticities. This is undertaken 
in Section 5.2.2. Simple examination of the coefficient estimates 
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does, however, yield some useful observations. 
5.2.1 	Coefficient Estimates 
The specifications yield estimated coefficients which, in many 
cases, do not agree with expectations. In seven of the fourteen 
reported cases the coefficient a 1 was negative (statistically 
significant only in Perth), demonstrating the expected effect of 
the existing stock of housing on the real price of housing. In 
Adelaide (1) and Hobart (1), however, the estimates indicate a 
significant positive effect. The income effect was positive in all 
cases, except for a non-significant negative income effect in 
Adelaide (1) and (2). The coefficient a 3 on the demographic 
variable was positive in all cases (significant in four) except 
Adelaide (1) and (2) (where it was, surprisingly, significantly 
negative). The measures of credit availability performed, poorly 
with the coefficient a 4 on CA1 positive, as expected, in only two 
cases (Melbourne (1) and Perth (1)), neither statistically 
significant, and cz; the coefficient a 4 on CA2 positive, as expected, 
in only one case (Hobart (1)), and not statistically significant. 
Indeed, there was one case in which the coefficient on CA I was 
negative and statistically significant and three cases in which the 
coefficient on CA 2 was negative and statistically significant 
(Adelaide (1) and Sydney (2), Melbourne (2) and Perth (2) 
respectively). 
The notable failing of the models, in the context of this 
study, was the variation in the performance of the variables MP, 
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AQLR, DN and UC'. The coefficient a 5 on MP was negative, as 
expected, in Hobart (1) only (and statistically significant) with 
there being two cases (Adelaide (1) and Perth (1)) in which the 
coefficient was positive and statistically significant. The coefficient 
a5 on AQLR was negative in three cases (none statistically 
significant) and was positive and statistically significant in two 
cases (Melbourne (2) and Perth (2)). The coefficient a 6 on DN was, 
in contrast to expectations, positive in all cases (significant in six of 
these) except for Perth and Hobart (significant for Hobart (1) only) 
and the coefficient a7 on UC' was negative, as expected, in six cases 
(Perth(1) and (2) being significant) and positive and significant in 
three cases (Melbourne (2) and Adelaide (1) and (2)). 
Of particular interest is the sign of the coefficient of the 
price expectations variable, logPh t+I. Agents in this model have 
been assumed to make rational forecasts of future housing asset 
prices and these forecasts determine the current asset price of 
housing. As outlined in Section 2.2.2, if agents expect rising asset 
prices and capital gains, then they should be content to hold their 
housing asset, even in the face of an increase in the rental cost of 
housing. In terms of the coefficient signs, a 8 is expected to be 
positive, implying that rational expectations of real house price 
inflation would fuel housing demand. Further, if rational 
expectations do account for movements in house prices, their 
impact should be significant enough to offset any dampening effect 
on demand experienced, ceteris paribus, through increases in the 
exogenous user-cost of housing. The results, however, indicate 
93 
CHAPTER FIVE: Results 
only six cases in which a 8 is positive and it is statistically 
significant in only one of these (Sydney(2)). Since both UC' and 
AlogPh t+1 are measured as percentages, their individual coefficient 
estimates may be compared in absolute magnitude. In making this 
comparison, it is clear that in only two cases is the price 
expectation effect large enough to offset the user-cost effect 
(Hobart (1)&(2)). 
5.2.2 	Elasticities 
The estimated elasticities provide some guide to the responsiveness 
of real house prices to changes in the independent variables 
included in the model. Whilst the direction of response is already 
implied by the sign of the estimated coefficient, the relative impact 
of the responses, implied by the elasticities, is of interest. 
Examining Table 4.4 indicates that, in the case of Sydney, 
Melbourne, Brisbane and Australia in aggregate, the strongest 
upward pressure on house prices in the sample period was exerted 
by the demographic variable, hh. Further, except in the case of 
Melbourne, the strongest downward pressure was exerted by the 
stock of housing. In contrast, a very large negative elasticity was 
estimated for Adelaide with respect to the demographic variable. This 
was partly offset by a very large positive elasticity with respect to the 
stock of housing. 
Income exerted a fairly strong upward pressure in all cases 
except Adelaide and Perth. Due to the definition of the dependent 
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variable, it is difficult to compare these elasticity magnitudes with 
those of previous studies. A comparable income elasticity of 
housing demand can be derived, however, by inverting the 
percentage change in real house prices brought about by a 
percentage change in the real housing stock and multiplying this 
by the percentage change in real house prices brought about by a 
percentage change in income. For the cases in which this can be 
considered legitimate, the derivation yields income elasticities of; 
0.93 for Sydney, 2.13 for Brisbane and 0.91 for Australia. These are 
very different to the values of 1.36, 0.19 and 0.50 respectively, 
estimated by Selvanathan (1988) and are also at odds with Yates' 
(1981b) low estimate of 0.122 for Australia as a whole. 
The responsiveness of real house prices to credit 
- i - - 	 -- - i- - - - availability s negligable n all cases except Adelaide, and varies in 
direction. This lends some support to De Rosa's (1978) and Meltzer's 
(1978) 	research, which failed to find any impact of credit 
availability. 1 
The elasticity of real house prices with respect to the initial 
mortgage payment is, in all but one case, positive and, in some 
cases, quite large. This is in direct contrast to the effect postulated 
as the 'tilt effect'. The largest influence, however, was in the case of 
1 De Rosa's (1978) approach to assessing the impact of credit availability 
on residential investment was to analyse mortgage rationing in 	terms of its 
impact on the household's balance sheet. He argued that, 	if an excess 
demand for mortgages was to dampen housing demand in any important 
way, the major part of the excess mortgage demand must be 	absorbed in the 
household balance sheet by an excess demand for houses, rather than 
other items in the balance sheet. If households are free to adjust the other 
items in their balance sheet, then it is reasonable to expect that credit 
rationing would not be manifested in a fall in the demand for housing. 
95 
CHAPTER FIVE: Results 
Hobart, where the value of the elasticity is -0.85. 
The quite large elasticity with respect to the measure of the 
effective mortgage duration is a puzzle, particularly since it is 
positive in five of the seven reported cases. This, again is in direct 
contrast to the influence postulated. Surprisingly, it appears to 
exert a stronger influence on prices than the initial mortgage 
payment. The very small elasticity with respect to the exogenous 
user-cost component and, indeed, with respect to the price 
expectations variable was also unexpected. The latter indicates that, 
within the present model, expectations of future real house prices 
do not exert a strong influence on real house prices, nor do they 
appear to play an important role in determining the current asset 
price of housing. This is in direct contrast to the hypothesis 
outlined in section 2.2.2 and implied by the assumption of rational 
expectations in the theoretical model. 
These observations about the individual coefficient 
estimates and their associated elasticities simply report the 
findings. It remains to attempt to analyse the implications of the 
results and these observations in the context of the present study. 
In doing so, the interpretation is guarded, since the empirical 
analysis, owing to the variation in performance of the explanatory 
variables across the different cities, provides little conclusive 
evidence in support or refutation of the hypotheses of the study. 
5.3 IMPLICATIONS OF RESULTS WITHIN PRESENT MODEL 
In this section the discussion is limited to the estimated coefficients 
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that were found to be statistically significant. 	The most regular 
results that emerge from estimation of the empirical model are: 
(i) The estimated coefficients of the income and demographic 
variables were largely of expected sign and exerted 
relatively strong influence on the behaviour of real house 
prices and the current demand for housing; 
(ii) None of the estimated coefficients of the credit availability 
variable were of expected sign, nor do the results indicate a 
very strong influence of credit availability on the current 
demand for housing; 
(iii) The coefficients on the initial mortgage payment variable 
and exogenous user-cost were generally not of expected 
sign yet in some cases were quite large; and 
(iv) The strong positive influence of the effective mortgage 
duration variable (in all but one case) is a puzzle. 
Table 5.1 contains a summary of these results. 
Table SI 
Summary of Statistically Significant Results 
Variable Coefficient Expected Sign 
Number of Cases in which Coefficient 
Statistically Significant and: 
of Expected Sign Not of Expected Sign TOTAL 
H a l <0 2 2 4 
y a2 >0 2 2 
1212 a3 >0 4 2 6 
CA a4 >0 4 4 
MP a5 <0 1 4 5 
DN a6 <0 1 6 7 
UC a7 <0 2 3 5 
ti1oght+1 ag >0 1 1 2 
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Empirical estimation of the theoretical model provides little 
conclusive evidence to enable the hypotheses of the present study 
to be either rejected or not rejected. 
Specifically, the discussion of the effects of inflation on the 
demand for owner-occupied housing and the structure of the 
theoretical model implied the following hypotheses: 
I That, ceteris paribus, inflation will tend to reduce the 
current demand for housing (and thus current house 
prices) through the characteristics of the mortgage 
instrument. (Channel One) 
II That, ceteris paribus, inflation will tend to increase the 
current demand for housing (and thus current house 
prices) by reducing the user-cost of homeownership. 
(Channel Two) 
Under the maintained assumption that agents form expectations 
rationally, the resolution of the two effects hypothesised in I and II 
will imply: 
Outcome (a): a net reduction in the current demand for housing 
in response to inflation if channel one dominates 
channel two (see Section 3.4.1). House prices and the 
stock of housing units would therefore tend to 
decrease in response to an increase in inflation, 
ceteris paribus.; and 
Outcome (b): a net increase in the current demand for owner-
occupied housing in response to inflation if channel 
two dominates channel one (see Section 3.4.2). House 
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prices and the stock of housing units would 
therefore tend to increase in response to an 
increase in inflation, ceteris paribus. 
Prima facie, the results presented above suggest that the 
characteristics of the mortgage instrument dominate the influence 
of the user-cost of home ownership on the current real asset price 
of, and the current demand for, owner-occupied housing. This may 
be interpreted as implying that channel one dominates channel 
two, but, except in the case of Hobart, not in the way hypothesised 
under Outcome (a). In fact, the signs of the estimated coefficients 
imply that the net effect of this outcome may be to increase the 
current demand for housing. That is, the results imply that Outcome 
(a) may instead bring about the dynamic effects described under 
Outcome (b). This is a consequence of the strong positive influence 
of the variable DN. 
It would, however, be unwise to conclude anything about 
the relative impacts of the two inflationary channels from this, 
since none of the cases provided enough statistically significant 
estimates to justify any such conclusion. Whilst this is somewhat 
discouraging, it does not, in itself, provide a basis upon which to 
dismiss the theoretical framework. 
5.4 LIMITATIONS OF THE ANALYSIS 
The data limitations of the study, that were known ex ante , were 
discussed in Section 4.4. The empirical evidence is suggestive but 
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incomplete and it remains to evaluate the study in the light of 
technical inadequacies and possible conflicting theory. 
5.4.1 	Inadequacies of the Modelling Technique 
The theoretical framework employed in this study has drawn on the 
models of several authors. While the essential features of these 
models have been retained, the way in which they have been 
combined is novel, and may be subject to criticism. 
Each of the variables posited to capture the effects of 
inflation on the current demand for housing was developed on the 
basis of economic theory. The way in which they are incorporated 
together in the inverse demand function, however, is largely ad 
hoc. A broader household consumption-portfolio model may have 
been more revealing. 
Since the question of tenure choice has not been addressed, 
the effect of the relative price of rental and owner-occupied 
housing has been overlooked. Given that the focus of the study has 
been upon the effect of inflation on the demand for housing as an 
asset (which provides a service flow over time) this is not 
considered to be a severe limitation. Rather, it may serve as a useful 
extension to the asset market model developed. 
Application of the same model specification to each State 
Capital city fails to allow for the possibility of any inter-city 
differences. A full inter-regional economic analysis was beyond 
the scope of the present study, but it may be that the failure to 
incorporate specific regional characteristics was in part 
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responsible for the inconsistency of the results across the different 
cases. 
Finally, the way in which the influence of credit 
availability has been examined in the present study may be open to 
question. Fair and Jaffee (1972) have argued that a rigorous 
examination of the impact of credit availability requires the 
specification and estimation of a disequilibrium model. The 
equilibrium model specified in the present study may, therefore, 
restrict possibilities for examining the impact of credit rationing. 
5.4.2 Inadequacies in Data Generation and Use 
The necessary use of time series data in the application of the 
rational expectations hypothesis proved to be a serious limitation to 
the development of the empirical model. Perhaps the most severe 
limitation to the study in this context, however, was the need to 
generate series for many of the important variables. 
The precise interpretation of the two variables created to 
measure credit availability is uncertain and, in relation to the first, 
Hendershott (1980) has argued that: 
"This variable ignores the impact of inflation on 
the purchasing power of the existing stock of 
deposits, deposits that are constantly being used to 
finance houses, that are rolling over at higher 
prices." [1980, p.412] 
Further, neither measure takes account of the increase in mortgage 
financing that has been undertaken by non-traditional lenders, for 
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example, credit unions. 
The series generated for the initial mortgage payment was 
based on the average size of a loan made in each State in each 
quarter. The initial mortgage payment on a household's desired 
real value of a house in relation to that household's real disposable 
income would clearly capture the impact of the tilt problem and the 
non-price rationing of mortgage finance much better. In the 
absence of broad-based survey information about household and 
lender behaviour, however, the desired real value of a house is 
unknown. Using the average value of a loan to proxy the desired 
real value of a house to some extent accommodates the mortgage 
payment constraint in the sense that it is the value of the loan 
approval rather than the value of the loan applied for. It takes no 
account of the value of the house for which the loan was approved 
and, in turn, gives no information about the initial loan-to-value 
ratio. This, in addition to the difficulty in obtaining valid mortgage 
interest rate data (see Section 4.4), renders the calculated series for 
MP and DN open to criticism and may be partially responsible for 
the puzzling results. 
Specification of the user-cost series was also a difficult task, 
since generation of a series on the unobservable inflationary 
expectations for each State Capital city was required. The use of 
optimal forecasting techniques for this purpose was a necessary 
simplification but may be deficient. 
As already noted, the use of the median sale price of an 
established house in each State Capital city to represent the asset 
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price of housing is imperfect. In particular, no adjustment is made 
for the quality of housing units. In the US studies data on quality-
adjusted new house prices was utilised but no such data was 
available for Australia. 
For consistency, both the price and quantity of housing 
stock should ideally be measured in homogeneous units. On the 
supply-side, the number of dwelling commencements, rather than 
their value, was utilised in attempt to partially overcome the 
inconsistency of using the price of established houses on the 
demand-side. 
The reservations about the data series utilised for income 
and demographic characteristics were addressed in Section 4:4?. 
5.4.3 	Alternative Theoretical Rationale 
Sound methodology requires that the possibility of conflicting 
theory be acknowledged. However, it is difficult to offer an 
alternative theoretical rationale which would predict the 
coefficient signs obtained in the present study. 
Some possible reasons for the negative impact of credit 
availability have already been given but the frequently positive 
impact of MP, DN and UC' remains a puzzle. Although the results 
yielded by the empirical model may cast some doubt on the 
approach, it is likely that the scarcity of suitable data and the 
construction of some series are the most severe limitations to the 
analysis. 
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CHAPTER SIX: 
Conclusions and Options for Future Research 
In this study, a dynamic model of the housing market was developed 
and utilised in an attempt to analyse the effect of inflation on the 
current demand for housing in Australia. The theoretical model 
developed was a partial equilibrium, asset market model, in which 
housing was considered as an investment good that supplied a flow of 
housing services over time. Expectations of future housing asset 
prices were assumed to be formed rationally and to therefore 
determine the current asset price of housing. 
Inflation was postulated to affect current housing demand 
decisions through two channels. First, through the institutional 
features of the mortgage market and second, through its influence on 
the user-cost of home-ownership. A brief and simple examination of 
the evidence of a Fisher effect in the determination of Australian 
nominal interest rates served as a useful extension to the analysis. 
Empirical investigation of the model necessitated the use of 
McCallum's (1976) instrumental variables technique, which provides 
consistent estimates of relationships involving rational expectations 
variables. The scarcity of data relating to the Australian housing 
market was a significant constraint to the empirical analysis and the 
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results obtained were only of consequential significance. Indeed, a 
notable failing of the empirical side of the study was the variation in 
the performance of the variables of particular interest; MP, DN and 
UC, and the inconsistency of the associated coefficient estimates. 
Since the results provided little conclusive evidence in 
support or refutation of the stated hypotheses, little inference could 
be made about the likely path of house prices or the size of the stock 
of housing units in a changed inflationary environment. Therefore, 
the policy implications of the effects postulated could not be assessed. 
Had the results been of greater quantitative significance, they could 
have been employed usefully as the basis for a number of simulation 
experiments. For example, the estimated coefficients of the inverse 
demand function could have been used to compute the dynamic 
impacts of changes in inflationary expectations on the Australian 
housing market. 
It would be unwise to use the poor results as grounds for the 
dismissal of the modelling technique or methodology , of the study. 
With the benefit of hindsight, it appears that the inconsistencies are 
a likely result of inadequacies in data generation and use. 
Recent experience of a significant downturn in housing 
activity, in the presence of high nominal mortgage interest rates, is 
suggestive of a significant influence of the cost of housing finance 
on the demand for housing, although the extent to which the 
increased nominal rates are evidence of a Fisherian adjustment 
process is not clear. As new data come to hand, post-deregulation, 
further empirical investigation of the theoretical framework 
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developed in this study may prove more fruitful. Future research 
efforts may be directed better towards developing a sound and 
extensive data set for empirical analysis rather than towards refining 
the theoretical analysis. 
Although the explicit empirical objective of the research was 
not met, the implicit theoretical objectives were. The research was 
also undertaken in a sound and systemmatic way. By looking at two 
channels through which inflation was posited to affect current 
housing demand decisions, and drawing together two streams of 
literature that have emerged in this area of research, a simple, but 
thorough, theoretical framework was developed. This framework, and 
the economic theory upon which it was based, gives some insight 
into the possible effects of inflation in the Australian housing 
market. 	The hypotheses implied by the analysis were, in principle, 
testable but, 	until adequate information is available upon which 
model estimation can be based, the relative merits of the theoretical 
rationale cannot be assessed fairly. It is a topic worthy of further 
investigation. 
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Consider a homebuyer who purchases a 1985/86 median priced 
Australian house at $78,000, pays a 10 percent cash deposit of $7,800 and 
obtains a T=20 year SFPM for the remaining $70,200 which bears a real 
rate of interest of 6 percent per annum, compounded quarterly. If 
Fisherian interest rates are assumed, so that the nominal interest rate, 
i, is the sum of the real interest rate, r, and an allowance for the fully 
anticipated rate of inflation, Te e, then when ne = 0% , r = 6% = i the 
quarterly mortgage payments the homebuyer will be required to pay to 
fully amortise the $70,200 over 20 years are calculated as: 
A = R. An,wm 	or 	R = A/An  
where R 	= quarterly payment; 
= number of compounding periods = T.m 
where m is the frequency of compounding each 
year (i.e. quarterly compounding implies m=4); 
i/m 
	
	= nominal rate of interest per compounding 
period; 
A 	= the present value of an ordinary annuity; and 
An, i/m = the present value of $1 per period for n periods 
compounded at the rate i/m per period. 
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Hence, R = $70,200/A80,0.015 = $1,512.69 per quarter. 
If the nominal interest rate increased to just over 16 percent 
in the light of anticipated inflation of 9.5 percent then the quarterly 
mortgage payments for the homebuyer would increase to: 
R = $70,200/A80 002 = $2,946.40 per quarter. 
[N o t e : the nominal interest rate is here calculated on the basis that: 
(1+i)=(1+r)(1+ ne)] 
In the absence of inflation, the nominal and real quarterly 
payments would be constant and equal at $1,512.69 per quarter. As 
anticipated inflation increases the nominal interest rate, however, the 
time profile of the stream of real quarterly payments changes, as 
shown in Table A.1, where the second column headed "Real Quarterly 
Payment" shows the constant (year 0) dollar value of the nominal 
quarterly payment calculated as: 
Real Payment = Nominal Payment (l+ne) - t 
where t is the number of years of the loan that have elapsed. 
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TABLE A.1 
Year 	Nominal Quarterly 
Payment 
Real Quarterly 
Payment 
Real Annual 
Payment 
ne=0%, r=6%, i=6% 
0 	1,512.69 
5 1,512.69 
10 	1,512.69 
15 1,512.69 
20 	1,512.69 
1,512.69 
1,512.69 
1,512.69 
1,512.69 
1,512.69 
6,050.76 
6,050.76 
6,050.76 
6,050.76 
6,050.76 
ne=7%, r=6%, 1=13.5% 
0 	2,536.20 2,536.20 10,144.80 
5 2,536.20 1,808.28 7,233.12 
10 	2,536.20 1,289.28 5,157.12 
15 2,536.20 1,009.24 3,676.96 
20 	2,536.20 655.40 2,621.60 
ne=9.5%, r=6%, i=16 % 
0 	2,946.40 2,946.40 11,785.60 
5 2,946.40 1,871.63 7,486.54 
10 	2,946.40 1,188.91 4,755.66 
15 2,946.40 755.23 3,020.92 
20 	2,946.40 479.74 1,918.97 
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The following example serves to illustrate the type of constrained 
utility maximisation problem which underlies the derivation of the 
Marshallian demand curves discussed in Section 2.2.1 of the text. The 
problem presented here is very similar to that which formed the basis 
of the analysis in Male (1988). 
Suppose the specific form of the household utility function 
is: 
v = 	( 1-FT)-11' 1 . ( -Ct-P - Y H • p > 0 	(B.1) 
which is the CES function used by Schwab (1982) and Alm and Follain 
(1984). 	p is the parameter representing the elasticity of marginal 
utility , -(p +1) is the elasticity of marginal utility with respect to ct and 
y is the parameter which relates the utility of housing to the utility of 
the composite non-housing good. 
Collapsing the planning horizon into two periods (the first 
representing the current year and the second all subsequent years) 
and assuming the purchase of H units of housing stock is 
bond-financed at the beginning of the first period, the household's 
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intertemporal budget constraint (abstracting from bequests) may be 
written: 
Y1 + b + Y2/(1+i ) + Ph2eH/(1+i ) = 
P i C i + b + P2eC2/(1+i ) + bi/(1+i) + b/(1+i ) 	(13.2) 
	
where Y t 	= expected nominal income stream in period t; 
= bond issues at the beginning of period 1; 
P1 	= price of non-housing goods in period 1; 
P2e = price of non-housing goods expected to prevail 
in period 2; 
Ph2e = purchase price per unit of housing stock 
expected to prevail in period 2; and 
= nominal interest rate. 
The household is assumed to have no inherited wealth or initial debt 
and, to be out of debt at the end of the planning horizon, the household 
must redeem all outstanding bonds in the second period, having paid 
interest on them at the end of the first period. These debts are assumed 
to be cleared in the second period through the sale of the house. 
Since households are generally restricted by lenders to 
borrowing less than 100 per cent of the purchase price of the home as 
a mortgage, the bond issues may be expressed as: 
b = L. PhiH 
where 	L 	= initial loan-to-value ratio (proportion of the house 
purchase which is bond-financed); and 
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Ph i = the purchase price per unit of housing stock in 
period 1. 
Furthermore, since households are typically unable to borrow and lend 
at the same nominal interest rate, a differential borrowing rate, i b , 
may be introduced to capture the cost of mortgage finance and i o , the 
nominal discount rate, represents the opportunity cost of housing 
equity acquisition. 
Incorporating these features into (B.2): 
Y i + Y2/(1+io) = PIC' + P2eC2/(1+i0 ) + L PhiH 1b/(1+io) 
+ (1-L)Ph1H 10/(1+i0 ) + Ph1li/(1+10 ) - Ph2efl/(1+i0 ) 	(B.3) 
where (1-L)Ph1Hi0/(1+i0 ), which is the downpayment on H, is financed 
out of current consumption expenditure because of the assumption that 
the household's initial net wealth is zero. Note that the difference 
between Ph2e and Phi represents the nominal capital gains (or losses) 
that the household expects to accrue at point of sale. 
The expected future prices may be rewritten as: 
P2e = Pi[ 1 + 7Ce] ; and 
Ph2e = Phi[ 1+ ice + iche] 
where IC e is the expected rate of general price inflation and nhe is the 
expected rate of real house price inflation (analagous to Ph'/Ph in the 
112 
APPENDIX B 
text). Combining these expressions with the budget constraint in (B.3) 
yields: 
Y1 + Y2/( 1 +io) = P1C1 	P1[ 1 +70] C2/( 1 +10) 
+ Ph i HJL ib + (1-L) io - ne -  he] /(1+i0) (B.4) 
The term [Lib + (1-L)i0 -n e - TC he] 	represents the user-cost of 
owner-occupied housing assuming, for simplicity of illustration, the 
absence of depreciation, maintainance, property taxes and 
miscellaneous expenses. 
The marginal utilities derived from the utility function in (B.1) are: 
aU/aCi = p C I O +1) = MUC1 
awac2 = p (1÷T)-1 c2-0 +1) = Alm —C2 
awaH = p y [1+ 0+,0- 1 ] HO + 1) = muH 
Maximising (B.1) subject to the intertemporal budget constraint in 
(B.4), utilising the marginal utilities derived above, yields the 
following first-order conditions: 
MUC1" XP1 = 
	 (B.5) 
MUc2 - XPI[ 1 + Ir ej (1+0' 1 = 0 
	
(B.6) 
MUH - X[Lib + (1-L)i0 - n e - ithe] (1+10)4 = 0 
	
(B.7) 
Y1 + Y2 ( 1 +0 -1 	P1C1 P1[ 1 +7Ce] C2 ( 1 +i0)4  
- Phill.[Lib + (1-L)i0 - ir e - Khe] (1+i0) -1 = 0 	(B.8) 
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where A. is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget 
constraint and C1 , C2, H and X are non-negative. 
The first-order conditions in (B.5)-(B.8) may be solved 
simultaneously to yield the household's commodity demands of the 
general form: 
CI = gi ( W , P1, P2e, Phi, UC) 
C2 = g2 f W, P i , P2e, Phi, UC) 
H = f { W , Pi, P2e, Phi, UC) 
where W = total nominal lifetime wealth; and 
UC = [Lib + (1-L)l0  - ice - nhe]. 
The housing demand function described in the text has 
other determinants, (i.e. hh, CA and M in equation (2.1)), and the 
user-cost measure includes, in equation (2.4), other terms (i.e. x , d and 
m ). The problem outlined above could be extended to incorporate these 
other determinants and the solution procedure would be the same, 
albeit more cumbersome. Further, it should be noted that the explicit 
solutions implied by the first-order conditions depend on the choice of 
the explicit form of the household utility function (assumed, in the 
example above, to be a CES function). 
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APPENDIX C 
In examining the effect of inflation on nominal interest rates in 
Australia, the first task is to obtain a proxy for the explanatory 
variable, namely inflationary expectations. In previous studies a 
variety of models of inflationary expectations have been used; 	from 
Feldstein and Summers' (1978) ARIMA(1,1,1), 	Poterba's (1984) rolling 
ARMA(1,1), Rosen, Rosen and Holtz-Eakin's (1984) ARIMA(1,1,0) to 
Goodwin's (1986) bivariate AR process. After some preliminary analysis 
of the Australian Consumer Price Index data, a first-order moving 
average process was selected. Since stationarity required first 
differencing the data, inflationary expectations were modelled as an 
ARIMA(0,1,1) process with the following results: 
Ay t = ( 1 - 0.6956 B ) 
(0.0829) 	 R2 = 0.3543 
where v t is a serially uncorrelated error term with EN t)=0 and 
vary t = 	u 2 ; 	t is a first-differenced series (i.e. 	=1-B) on the 
quarterly rate of inflation in the Consumer Price index; and B is the 
'backshift' or lag operator. 	The addition of a constant term did not 
improve the fit, whereas the t statistic associated with the e 1 parameter 
115 
APPENDIX C 
estimate showed 0 i t° be statistically significantly different from zero. - 
By way of diagnostic checking, a quantitative analysis on 
the residuals generated by the model was carried out. The random 
error terms, D v in the actual inflationary process are assumed to be 
normally distributed and independent of each other. Therefore, if the 
model is specified correctly, then the residuals, which are estimates of 
the unobservable error terms, should resemble a "white noise" process. 
A convenient test of this, developed by Box and Pierce (1970 ), is based 
on the Q statistic, referred to in some texts as the Portmanteau test 
statistic. The Q statistic is calculated as: 
Q = n (r i 2 + r22 + r3 2 + 	 + rk 2) 
where the r's are the residual autocorrelations for displacement 1 	k, 
and n is the number of sample observations. The Q statistic is a 
chi-square distributed variable with (k-p-q) degrees of freedom, where 
p is the number of autoregressive parameters (p=0 in this case) and q is 
the number of moving average parameters (q=1 in this case) in the 
model at hand. A statistical hypothesis test of model assumptions can be 
performed by comparing the observed value of Q with the appropriate 
critical values from a x 2 table. The null hypothesis for this test is; Ho: 
all the residuals are white noise. 
The printout from the TSP (Version 4.2) Box-Jenkins 
estimation procedure contains the calculated values of the Q statistic for 
the first k=20 autocorrelations of the residuals. For the ARIMA(0,1,1) 
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model the null hypothesis cannot be rejected for all 20 autocorrelations 
at both the 90% and 95% levels of confidence i.e. the probability that 
the residuals are drawn from a white noise process is at least 95%. To 
determine if this was the "best" specification, many more ARIMA 
models were tested but it was not possible to obtain a lower chi-square 
statistic. The only model specification that resulted in a comparable Q 
statistic was the ARIMA(0,1,2) and, since the parameter estimate for 0 2 
was not significantly different from zero, it is reasonable to conclude 
that the addition of a second moving average term was fruitless. Hence, 
the ARIMA(0,1,1) model was retained as the appropriate specification. 
Once the appropriate model had been specified and tested, 
the next task was to calculate the forecasts of inflation that it implied. 
The optimal ARIMA forecasting procedure of Box and Jenkins (1970) 
was used for this purpose. Since the forecast inflation rate for time t 
was assumed to be based only on information available at that time, it 
was necessary to estimate a seperate Box Jenkins equation for each 
quarter. That is, for each quarter 1980:1 to 1989:1 an ARIMA(0,1,1) 
model was fitted to the data on quarterly inflation rates for the 
previous five years. As Rosen et. al. (1984) have suggested; 
"It is not obvious how far into the past the observations 
for each forecasting equation should go. One possible 
procedure is to choose some arbitrary length of time 
(say ten years) and assume that individuals use data 
only within that period to make their forecasts. Each 
year a new observation is added, and simultaneously 
the observation at the end of the sample is dropped." 
[p.408] 
Rosen et.al . also discuss the alternative assumption that 
individuals   employ new information as it becomes available over time, 
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but continue to use the old information as well. Implying the number of 
observations upon which the forecasting equation is based grows each 
year. They found that the second assumption performed better but 
acknowledge that there is little theoretical basis for choosing between 
the two assumptions about how individuals process information. The 
first assumption is employed in this study since it was considered to be 
more applicable to a sample period which incorporates the high 
inflation period in the 1970's. This implicitly assumes that individuals 
have since recognised that those years were 'out of the ordinary'. 
The relatively short five-year period was chosen to reflect 
the postulate that agents, who possess limited ability to process 
information, would be unlikely to 'look back' any more than twenty 
quarters when forming their expectations. This is, however, as stated 
above, quite an arbitrary choice, but convenient, in that it allows many 
more forecast observations to be made given that Australian quarterly 
inflation rate data has only been available since the very late 1960's. 
The same model specification was used each time in the absence of a 
theoretical basis to do otherwise. 
Once estimated, the equation for each quarter was used to 
forecast the inflation rate for the next quarter. This follows the 
"rolling ARMA" technique used by Poterba and Feldstein and Summers 
to generate a time series of expected inflation rates. Some justifications 
for this procedure are discussed by Friedman (1979). 
For example, the model: 
=1) t 0 1 
is a moving average reaching back oAe period and; 
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it = ( 1 - 0.7106 B ) 
(0.1129) 
was fitted to quarterly observations on the CPI for the sample period 
1975:2 to 1980:1 inclusive. This gave a one-period ahead forecast (i.e. for 
1980:2) of 2.6 to 2 significant figures. The value 2.6 is the expectation, 
formed in the first quarter of 1980, of the quarterly inflation rate to 
prevail in the second quarter of 1980. That is, 2.6 is the 1980:1 
observation on the expected inflation rate. 
Table C.1 shows how these expectations performed by 
comparing the actual inflation rate that prevailed in period t with the 
forecast of inflation in period t that was formed in period (t-1). 
TABLE C.1 
Actual Inflation Rate in Quarter t 
Compared to what was Forecast 
for that Quarter in (t-1) 
Quarter 
(t) 
Actual Forecast 
made in 
(t - 1) 
Error 
(Actual-Forecast) 
1980:1 2.2 
1980:2 2.8 2.6 0.2 
1980:3 1.9 2.4 -0.5 
1980:4 2.1 2.4 -0.3 
1981:1 2.4 2.4 0.0 
1981:2 2.2 0.4 1.8 
1981:3 2.1 -0.6 2.7 
1981:4 4.2 2.5 0.7 
1982:1 1.7 2.4 -0.7 
1982:2 2.4 2.4 0.0 
1982:3 3.5 4.0 -0.5 
1982:4 3.0 2.6 0.4 
1983:1 2.2 2.5 -0.3 
1983:2 2.1 2.4 -0.3 
1983:3 1.6 2.3 -0.7 
1983:4 2.4 2.4 0.0 
1984:1 0.4 -0.3 0.1 
1984:2 0.2 0.7 -0.5 
119 
APPENDIX C 
Table 	C.1 	continued 	... 
1984:3 1.3 1.0 0.3 
1984:4 1.4 1.2 0.2 
1985:1 1.4 1.3 0.1 
1985:2 2.4 1.7 0.7 
1985:3 2.2 1.9 0.3 
1985:4 2.0 1.9 0.1 
1986:1 2.3 2.1 0.2 
1986:2 1.7 1.9 -0.2 
1986:3 2.6 2.2 0.4 
1986:4 2.9 2.7 0.2 
1987:1 2.0 2.3 -0.3 
1987:2 1.5 1.8 -0.3 
1987:3 1.7 1.8 -0.1 
1987:4 1.7 1.8 -0.1 
1988:1 1.8 1.8 0.0 
1988:2 1.7 1.8 -0.1 
1988:3 1.9 1.8 0.1 
1988:4 2.1 1.8 0.3 
Having generated a series for the unobservable 
explanatory variable the task remaining was to compare the evolution 
of nominal interest rates and the expected inflation rate. The 
regression results for the period 1980:1 to 1988:4 are summarised below 
[t statistics are in parenthesis]. These have been corrected for 
first-order autocorrelation of the residuals using the Cochrane-Orcutt 
procedure. 
MORTRATE = 2.885 + 0.001 EXPINF 
(7.687) (0.064) 
COMMBILL = 3.425 - 0.063 EXPINF 
(13.124) (-0.810) 
R2=0.944 irt2-41942 
DW=1.239 
Rho).976 
R2=0.525 r22=0.510 
DW=1.663 
Rho).724 
LONGBOND = 3.163 + 0.005 EXPLNF 
	
R2=-0.595 It2 0.582 
(25.073) (0.130) 	 DW=1.782 
Rho-.748 
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where 	MORTRATE = the predominant saving bank nominal 
mortgage interest rate on new housing loans 
to individuals for owner-occupation; 
COMMBILL = the 90-day commercial bill nominal interest 
rate; and 
LONGBOND = the nominal interest rate paid on 20-year 
bonds. 
	
All data was taken 	from the Reserve Bank Monthly 
Bulletin (various issues). Where necessary, monthly data was converted 
to quarterly data and annual interest rates were converted to 
equivalent quarterly rates using the formula for the effective rate of 
interest. That is: 
( 1 + i/4 )4 = 1 + r 
where r is the quoted average annual nominal rate of interest and i is 
the annual nominal rate of interest. These analytical results are in 
sharp contrast to those obtained by Poterba (1984, p.735): 
MORTRATE = 4.14 + 1.10 	EXPINF + 0.65u_1 	R2-4.92 
(0.64) 	(0.15) (0.23) DW=1.29 
COMMBILL = 2.82 + 0.82 EXPINF + 0.53u4 
(0.36) 	(0.17) 	(0.29) 	DW=1.40 
Clearly, and especially in contrast to Poterba's results, 
these regression results do not support the proposition that nominal 
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interest rates are explained by the expected inflation rate. The results 
point clearly to the significance of only the constant term, which 
indicates that there is litle variablity in nominal interest rates over the 
sample period. In relation to the objective of this analysis, no jointness 
in the evolution of nominal interest rates and inflation rates has been 
identified. 
The results in the above three equations should not be 
alarming. Although other Australian researchers have found the 
estimated coefficient on their proxy variable for inflationary 
expectations to be significant, their estimated parameters were also 
very small in magnitude. For example, Volker's (1981) estimation of a 
number of alternative model specifications for determining the 
importance of inflationary expectations in the formulation of the 
90-day commercial bill rate in Australia, yielded coefficients ranging 
from a low of 0.105 (s.e.=2.37) to a high of 0.209 (s.e.=4.36). "Probably the 
most striking aspect of the results", says Volker, "is the small extent to 
which inflationary expectations appear to be incorporated in the 
nominal rate." [Volker, 1981, p.251] 
Although it may be possible to formulate specifications that 
would be able to better predict the behaviour of interest rates, by 
incorporating other explanatory variables, that would appear 
unnecessary for the task at hand. It remains that the above results 
indicate that there is no meaningful extent to which inflationary 
expectations (as determined by estimating a rolling ARIMA(0,1,1) 
process) appear to be incorporated into nominal rates for the period 
examined. 
There may be some doubt as to the adequacy of the proxy 
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variable used but, within the bounds of the present study, there is not 
a lot that can be do ne about this. Despite this, the evidence presented 
indicates that there are grounds for claiming that, for the period 
studied, the nominal mortgage interest rate in Australia is not 
responsive to changes in inflationary expectations. 
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When the empirical model was re-estimated using Permanent Building 
Society (PBS) nominal interest rates to serve as a proxy for the 
nominal mortgage interest rate that would have been charged by 
Savings Banks had they been unregulated for the entire sample 
period, the results presented in Table D.1 were obtained. The figures in 
bold type, in the columns headed (1)b and (2)b, are those for which 
only the PBS interest rate was used in calculating MP, DN and UC'. The 
figures in columns (1)a and (2)a are the original results for 
comparison. t statistics are given in square brackets. 
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Table D.1 
Model Estimation Using PBS Nominal Interest Rates.a 
Variable 
(1)a 
Sydney 
( 1 ) b 	(2)a (2)b (1)a 
Melbourne 
(1 )b 	(2)a (2)b . 
H 	-0.033 -0.059* -0.013 -0.004 0.456 0.056 0.302 0.040 
[- 1.386] [-2367] [-0.505] [-0.139] [1.494] [1527] [1.168] [1.595] 
13.196* 13.898* 2.243 -1.518 6.040 6.288 7.314 8.403 
[2.156] [2.147] [0.344] [-0.207] [0.854] [0.863] [1.282] [1.524] 
h h 	76561* 6 9 2 5 9 * 790 9 0* 7 9 1 6 8 * 1 2 749 1 6 8 7 7 8370 1 1 7 2 2 
[7.803] [7.228] [9.312] [8.210] [1.331] [1.620] [1.071] [1.527] 
CAI 	-0.039 -0.044 0.002 0.006 
[-0.656] [-0.742] [0.041] [0.096] 
CA2 -0.417* -0.470* -0.328* -0.411 
[-2.716] [-2.734] [-2.575] [-3386] 
MP 	6.140 10.562* ___ 5.788 0.397 
[1.054] [1.711] [1.101] [0.061] 
AQLR -0.123 -3.137 8.040* 3475 
[-0.026] [-0.558] [1.942] [0.914] 
DN 	6655* 4469 8004* 8072* 1 3 1 3 3* 15134* 13256*15322* 
[2.377] [1.420] [3.406] [2557] [4.898] [4.517] [6.257] 	[6.547] 
UC' 	-250.4 309.5 1152.6 1848.0 2910.3 34 3 0.1* 3375.4*3 686.7* 
[-0.221] [0.294] [0.983] [1.513] [1.474] [1.776] [2.118] [2.564] 
AlogPht+ 1 
151.98 155.75 	151.04* 	127.05 	-311.54 -360.49* 
-238.01*-245.08* [1.291] [1.267] [1.741] [1.284] [-1.667] [4.80] 
[4.743][4.917] 
constant 
-0.12x107*-0.11x107*-0.13x107*-0.13x107* -0.34x106*-0.43x106-0.261x106 *-034x106* 
[-6.377] [-5.682] [-7.268] [-6.259] [-1.983] [-2.177] [-1.863] [-2.394] 
R2 0.883 0.879 0.906 0.886 0.878 0.871 0.920 0.926 
K2 0.844 0.839 0.874 0.847 0.842 0.833 0.896 0.905 
DW 1.927 1.820 2.016 1.968 2.144 2.172 2.045 2.203 
Rho 0.015 0.064 -0.021 -0.012 -0.085 -0.101 -0.036 -0.115 
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Table D.1 continued ... 
Variable 
	 Brisbane 	 Adelaide 
(1)a (1)b (2)a (2)b (1)a (1)b (2)a (2)b 
-0.035 -0.089 0.007 0.074 0.517* 0.181 0.378 0.594 
[-0.483] [-1.188] [0.087] [0.937] [1.914] [0.409] [0.798] [1.175] 
15.685 17.221* 15.981* 14.021* -0.0004 -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0004 
[1.588] [1.792] [1.791] [1.881] [-0.779] [-0.656] [-0.751] [-1.049] 
h h 40 1 9 5* 4 0 0 0 5 * 33248 1 6 0 0 8 .36903*  - 3 9 7 7 1* -39747* -4 6 17 0* 
[1.980] [2.042] [1.598] [0.837] [-4.486] [-3.635] [-3.855] [-3.553] 
CA1 -0.043 -0.083 -0.315* -0.302 
[-0.274] [-0.537] [-1.675] [1.445] 
CA2 -0.345 -0.075 -0.881 -0.981 
[-0.913] [-0.2221 [-1.653] (-1.687] 
NIP 2.182 13.579 9.618* 19.171 
[0.124] [0.769] [2.433] [1.582] 
AQLR -5.780 -21.149 11.156 4.700 
[-0.329] [-1310] [1.015] [0.427] 
DN 3 33 0.6 999.9 2202.4 -5814.9 8893.6* 1016* 11516* 10290* 
[0.615] [0.172] [0.366] [-0.876] [3.762] [3.236] [3.252] [2.640] 
UC 975.5 1196.4* 495.9 312.1 5539.1* 5142.5* 4077.4* 4813.0* 
[0.567] [0.714] [0.317] [0.232] [3.166] [3.028] [1.930] [2.177] 
cilogPht+ i 
	
-571.890 -566.670 	-437.880 -120.050 	-267.180 -281.730 	-481.220 -513.780 
[4.470] 
	[-1.478] 	[-1.183] 	[-0329] 	[-1.002] 	[-0.827] 	[-1.178] 	[-1.1081 
constant 
-0.663x106*-0.62x10 6*-0.568x106*-0.27x1060.353x106*0.52x106*0.434x106*0.47x1o6 
[-2.093] 	[-2.036] 	[-1.726] 	[-0.860] 	[2.199] 	[2.646] 	[-1.728] 	[1.656] 
R2 	0.251 
	
0.267 	0.399 	0.591 	0.83 7 	0.798 	0.754 	0.714 
TZ2 	0.011 
	
0.033 	0.206 	0.460 	0.786 	0.736 	0.675 	0.622 
DW 	1.967 
	
1.956 	1.833 	1.426 	1.902 	2.008 	1.994 	2.011 
Rho 	0.007 
	
0.011 	0.078 	0.276 	0.029 	-0.024 	-0.017 	-0.023 
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Table D.1 continued ... 
Variable 	 Perth 	 Hobart 
(1)a 	(1)b 	(2)a 	(2)b 	(1)a 	(1)b 	(2)a 	(2)b 
-0.129* 	-0.159* 	-0.136* 	-0.134* 	1.402* 	1.651* 	1.089 	1.262 
[-2.1461 	[-2.860] 	[-2.582] 	[-2.6411 	[2.256] 	[1.833] 	[1.283] 	[1.709] 
-1.204 	-1.161 	1.273 	2.282 	15.158 	23.619 	31.592 	40.047 
[-0.606] 	[-0362] 	[0.585] 	[0.843] 	[0.645] 	[0.692] 	[1.031] 	[1.436] 
h h 	1153.2 	2 1 7 1.1 	3191.6 	4 1 6 9 .9 	7231.1 2 9 642 	30492 4 2 5 0 2 
[0.317] 	[0.698] 	[1.012] 	[1.232] 	[0.295] 	[0.688] 	[0.851] 	[1.338] 
CA1 	0.027 	0.029 	 -0.029 	0.013 
[0.321] 	[0353] [-0.587] 	[0.135] 
CA2 	 -0.212* 	-0.259* 	 0.010 	0.091 
[-1.879] 	[-1.923] [0.034] 	[0.458] 
MP 	12.726* 	18.150* 	 -26.813* -24.183 
[1.745] 	[2.226] [-2.437] 	[-1.6931 
AQLR 	 12.167* 	12.347* 	 -10.458 	-4.873 
[2.162] 	[2.077] [-0.633] 	[-0.579] 
DN 	-663.510 1379.5 	-60.182 	639.390 -13784* - 10445 	6805.6 - 3302.4 
[-0.385] 	[0.914] 	[-0.042] 	[0.476] 	[-2523] 	[-1.564] 	[-0.585] 	[-0.427] 
UC' 	-1173.0* -895.690 - 1116.4* -1088.7 -90.333 357.070 - 77.260 -56.505 
[-1.838] 	[-13741 	[-1.834] 	[4.653] 	[-0.107] 	[0.173] 	[-0.072] 	[-0.071] 
AlogPht+ i 
31.865 	30.751 	30.324 	13.067 	214.740 283.420 	123.640 201.890* 
[0.442] 	[0.436] 	[0.449] 	[0.175] 	[1.648] 	[0.577] 	[0.423] 	[2.576] 
constant 
71958 	45678 26755 	585.920 -0.22x106-0.67x106-0.67x106-0.95x106 
[0.850] 	[0.704] 	[0.372] 	[0.008] 	[-0.386] 	[ -0.7121 	[-0.818] [ -1305] 
R2 	0.757 	0.770 	0.788 	0.766 	0.844 	0.791 	0.687 	0.731 
K2 	0.679 	0.697 	0.721 	0.690 	0.706 	0.624 	0409 	0.516 
DW 	2.066 	2.072 	1.948 	1.997 	2.700 	2.322 	2.025 	1.627 
Rho 	-0.074 	-0.082 	-0.059 	-0.073 	-0.037 	-0.171 	-0.028 	0.183 
a. The smaller sample size for Hobart and AUSTRALIA warrant the larger values of the DW statistic 
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Table D.1 continued ... 
Variable 	 AUSTRALIA 
(1)a 	 (1)b 	 (2)a 	 (2)b  
H 	-0.031 -0.442 -0.039 -0.039 
	
[-1.260] 	[-13791 	[-1.444] 	[-1.256] 
Y 	35.429 	40.829 	30.762 	41.137* 
[1.576] [1.748] [1.496] [1.907] 
hh 	110050 	131350 	104950* 	132470* 
[1.707] [1.835] [1.919] [1.955] 
CAI 	-0.001 	-0.002 
[-0.316] 	[-0.462] 
CA2 	 -0.002 	-0.004 
[-0.191] [-0.282] 
MP 	19.914 	24.646 	 _ 	_ 
[1.051] 	[1.087] 
AQLR 	_ 	___ 	 21.785 	15.362 
[1.421] [1.010] 
DN 	6687.6 	2785.9 	8375.5 	2606.2 
[0.746] [0.268] [1.013] [0.262] 
UC' 	-539.680 	-254.170 	104.580 	90.137 
[-0.249] 	[-0.105] [0.050] [0.038] 
AlogPht+ 1-666.860 	-815.370 	-602.580 	-699.510 
[-1.023] 	[-1.079] [-1.050] [-1.007] 
constant -0.180x10 -0.209x107 -0.168x107*-0.212x107* 
[-1.717] 	[-1.826] 	[-1.890] 	(-1.986) 
R2 	0.673 	0.609 	0.715 	0.654 
R2 0.485 	0.385 0.552 0.457 
DW 	2.370 2.439 	2.226 	2.241 
Rho -0.227 	-0.245 -0.164 -0.174 
a. The smaller sample size for Hobart and AUSTRALIA warrant the larger values of the DW statistic. 
Note: Dependent variable in each case is rph = the real median price of houses; t statistics are in 
square brackets; * indicates significance at 0.05; the units of measurement of the variables give 
rise to their extreme relative magnitudes. 
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